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ABSTRACT

Modem Western Discourse on the Subject
by
Jongryul Choi
Dr. Simon Gottschalk, Examination Committee Chair
Professor of Sociology
University o f Nevada, Las Vegas

The purpose of this thesis is to explore the modem Western discourse of the
subject. This thesis will trace the roots o f the modem Westem discourse on the subject
from the Enlightenment era, which saw the subject as being autonomous, rational, stable,
and self-constitutive. It will contend that the Hegelian subject was the culmination of the
notion of the modem Westem subject. Lacanian psychoanalysis will be used to show how
this fictitious feature is constituted by the Oedipus story and how it works. This thesis
will show that the modem Westem politics was based on this fictitious subject,
exemplified by Hegelian subject, Freud’s ego and masculine subject, and Lacan’s moi and
speaking subject, and it will examine psychoanalytic feminists such as Kristeva and
Irigaray in order to find altemative notions of the subject. Finally, this thesis will present
the politics o f symptom based on the subject of the Real.
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CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

[T]he living Substance is being which is in truth Subject^ or, what is the
same, is in truth actually only in so far as it is the movement of positing
itself or is the mediation o f its self-othering with itself. This Substance is,
as Subject, pure, simple negativity, and is for this very reason the
bifurcation of the simple; it is the doubling which sets up opposition, and
then again the negation o f this different diversity and of its antithesis [the
immediate simplicity]. Only this self-res/orwg sameness, this reflection in
otherness within itself—not as an original or immediate unity as such—is
the True. It is the process of its own becoming, the circle that presupposes
its end as its goal, having its end also as its beginning; and only by being
worked out to its end, is it actual. (Hegel 1977; 10)
The subject is bom insofar as the signifier emerges in the field of the Other.
But, by this very fact, this subject—which was previously nothing if not a
subject coming into being—solidifies into a signifier...by being bora with the
signifier, the subject is bom divided. The subject is an emergence which,
just before, as subject, was nothing, but which having scarcely appeared,
solidifies into a signifier. (Lacan [1964b]: 199)
The term “subject” does not occupy a prominent position in the modem sociology,
where it was displaced by other terms such as “individual” and “agency”, but modem
sociology actually took the modem Westem notion of the subject as its theoretical basis.
The terms “individual” and “agency” are sociological versions of the philosophical term
“subject.”
The term “individual” has its roots in modem Westem world view, especially in the
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Enlightenment view, which saw human beings as self-conscious, autonomous and stable.
The essential difference between the Westem premodem subject and the Westem modem
subject is that “the modem subject is self-defining, where on previous views the subject is
defined in relation to a cosmic order” (Taylor 1975: 6). The modem human being as an
individual is said to be “curious about the world, confident in his own judgments, skeptical
of orthodoxies, rebellious against authority, responsible for his own beliefs and actions,
enamored of the classical past but even more committed to a greater future, proud o f his
humanity, conscious of his distinctness fi'om nature, aware of his artistic powers as
individual creator, assured of his intellectual capacity to comprehend and control nature,
and altogether less dependent on an omnipotent God” (Tamas 1991: 282).
This view was characteristically theorized by Descartes, who saw human beings as
thinking subjects without extension, and matter as extension without consciousness
(Descartes 1984: 126-31). The Cartesian Cogito is “certain of itself by virtue of expelling
all mundane content —the body, others, and the world —to the extemal realm of
contingency and dubitability” (Williams 1992: 141). This “disengaged subject” has an
innate capacity or reason which can take an objective attitude and look at the nature of
things which are devoid of any subjective meanings (Taylor 1989: 143-58). Although its
epistemology was different from the epistemology of rationalism, empiricism actually did
not deny the capacity of the humans mind, which can comprehend the natural world
outside of the human mind. Locke’s atomistic mind implies that it can faithfully represent
things as they actually exist outside it: “our understanding of things is constructed out o f
the building blocks o f simple ideas” (Taylor 1989: 166).
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The Enlightenment as the synthesis of rationalism and empiricism elaborated on
thenotion of modem subjectivity mentioned above, introducing the new notion of
objectivity which was mechanistic in its sense o f depending on efficient causation only.
The anthropology of Enlightenment was characterized by the amalgam of two notions of
the subject; “the notion of self-defining subjectivity correlative to the new objectivity; and
the view of man as part of nature, hence fully under the jurisdiction of this objectivity”
(Taylor 1975; 10). The self-defining subject was correlative to a disenchanted world
which is contingent, whereas man as part of nature opened the possibility of human studies
by way of the same method of natural science. The subject is free, but influenced by the
causation law of the natural world.
These two views were actually contradictory, but “reinforced each other in support
o f atomism, an atomic science o f nature matching a political theory whose starting point
was the individual in a state of nature” (Taylor 1975: 10). The atomic science of nature of
the times saw the world as the locus of contingent correlations, which are usually called
general principles or laws, to be traced by observation. The modem sociological theories
based on this Enlightenment synthesis of rationalism and empiricism had a strong belief in
reason and scientific objectivity. Humans are primarily rational beings who act on the
logic o f efficiency and rationality, and therefore, human behavior can be scientifically
studied, predicted, and, most importantly, controlled. So can society be the same because
it consists of humans and has no structural attributes. Rationalism emphasized
autonomous reason which takes an objective attitude toward the nature of things, and
empiricism also assumed that knowledge can be objective and that it can agree with
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external reality (Saiedi 1993; 24).
In sum, the modem sociological theories based on the Enlightenment assumed
that: 1) the subject is autonomous, rational, and stable and also acts rationally and
consistently; 2) objects of study (including human behaviors) can be objectively known by
the subject; 3) the adequacy of knowledge is judged according to the correspondence of
human’s cognition and reality; and 4) knowledge or science as an instrument of social
progress comprehends, predicts, and controls the objects o f studies for human welfare.
This set of theses starts from the notion of the subject as an autonomous and rational
individual and ends with the promise o f human welfare. The modem sociological theories
based on the Enlightenment promised to eliminate all kinds of prejudices and mystification
replete in human nature, society, and history (Horkheimer and Adorno 1993). They would
enable mankind to establish a social order in accordance with the true principles of nature
and history. Yet, miserable experiences of World War L, II, the nuclear devastation of
Japan, environmental pollution, etc. in the twentieth century betrayed this rosy promise
(Harvey 1990; Dickens and Fontana 1994).
The term “agency” emphasizes man’s capacity o f constituting himself as well as
the world. The modem sociological theories based on this notion o f subject directly
stemmed from Romanticism. According to Romanticism, the human being is a producer
as much as a product of society (Shalin 1986). This view is intimately interconnected with
the organic view o f man and society. Unlike the Enlightenment, Romanticism refuted a
dualistic view of the human being: “mind and body, reason and intuition, and subjective
and objective nature are one and indivisible” (Seidman 1983: 57). Following the

R ep ro d u ced with p erm ission o f th e copyright ow ner. Further reproduction prohibited w ithout perm ission.

Aristotelian anthropology in which adequate human life is a fulfillment of an idea, the
Romanticists saw human life as the realization of a purpose which the subject can
recognize as his own. The reason why man can recognize a purpose as his own is that
man is endowed with a soul or spirit. Man is an agency of a final cause, God, or the
absolute spirit. He actualizes the purpose of his life which was given by a final cause, God
or the absolute spirit. Each man has his own soul or sprit, and therefore, he fulfills his
purpose in life by going his own way. When man recognizes the purpose in his life as his
own, fi’eedom and necessity do not contradict each other any more.
Man is characterized by his wholeness within himself uniqueness, and freedom,
which is possible only in the process of his communion with society. Romanticism saw
human beings as set in a larger natural order, often conceived as a providential order with
which they should be in harmony. The Romantic vision of the individual is a unitary
organism rather than an atomistic machine of the Enlightenment. In this world, man is not
a fi’agmented unit which has a specific function, but a microcosm. In Romanticism, man’s
fi-eedom does not contradict the social order: “To be a romantic, we can say, is to believe
that fi-eedom can coexist with necessity, diversity with unity, and self-determination with
social order” (Shalin 1986: 89).
Romanticism strongly believed in man’s reason, which is formed and limited by
culture and history, and it also valued man for his imaginative and spiritual aspirations, his
artistic creativity, and his emotional depth. The Romantic notion of reason results in a
specific epistemology different fi'om the empirical epistemology. Unlike the
Enlightenment’s theoretical reason. Romantic reason always appears in concrete culture; it
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creates the culture and at the same time is created by it. Therefore, knowledge is
mediated by human practice from which a new objectivity can be established. The world
is a realization of human reason, and new objectivity refers to the correspondence of the
human practice and the world*. For example, Kant, a forerunner of Romanticism,
proposed that the problem of the mind-world correspondence can be solved by the active
mind which shapes and forms objective knowledge (Tamas 1991; Saiedi 1993). This
knowledge will bring human beings freedom and self-realization, namely progress.
In sum, modem sociological theories based on Romanticism assumed that: 1) the
subject is self-constituting (free and autonomous) by way of constituting society; 2) the
objects of human studies can be known by the subject; 3) the objectivity of knowledge is
achieved by human practice, namely, the unity o f a human’s action and humanized reality;
and 4) knowledge as an instrument of social progress understands and controls the objects
of studies for human freedom. This set of theses starts from ± e notion of subject as selfconstituting and ends with the promise of human freedom. The modem sociological
theories based on Romanticism promised to eliminate all kinds of oppression and
domination replete in the human mind, society, and history. They would enable mankind
to establish a social order in accordance with the true nature of human beings, i.e.,
freedom. Yet the collapse of the USSR gave evidence that this rosy promise failed.

* Also, Romanticism emphasizes the limitation of reason; it argued that life, reality,
humans, and society cannot be adequately understood through rational means. In this
respect. Romanticism can be characterized as non-rationalism (Saiedi 1993). But it cannot
be argued that it denied the creative power of reason. It is important to note that
Romanticism, like Enlightenment, strongly believed in man’s power.
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Fragmentation and alienation rather than organic unity within, which are prevalent in
Westem societies, also challenge the promise.
Now, we encounter the crisis o f the modem Westem subject. Of course, the crisis
of subjectivity was conceived by the Counter-Enlightenment thinkers such as Nietzsche,
and therefore, some could think that this is not really a new crisis. But it cannot be denied
that the sense of crisis becomes more apparent in these times called the postmodern era.
On the political level, this sense o f crisis reflects the loss of Westem hegemony over other
countries, and at the intellectual level, it reflects the lack of self-confidence o f the Westem
thinkers (Bauman 1987). Poststructuralism especially is an articulation of Western
thinkers’ doubts about the modem mode of reading and writing human, society, and
history, which was based on the autonomous subject. According to this reflection, the
way the (male) subject constructs his (phantasmatic) identity as an autonomous subject is
similar to the way the canons organize their authority by constructing others female and
non-Westem people) as screens upon which authorial desire (of the modem Westem
white males) is projected and displaced (Clough 1992).
Sociology has been relatively reluctant to accept these poststructuralist arguments
about the crisis of representation and deconstruction of the subject. From a historical
viewpoint, it seems to be because sociology is a product of modernity; “sociology’s
capacity to define modernity is limited by sociology itself being a product of modernity... A
residual positivism in the discipline would probably prefer to avoid the hermeneutic
confusion of sociology being part o f that which it seeks to understand, and perhaps for this
reason sociologists have been slow to enter the current intellectual debate over the proper
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usage and importance o f notions of modernity, modernism, and post-modernism” (Frank
1987; 295).
This paper sprang from the discontent about this situation. It aims to trace the
root of the crisis in the modem Western notion of subject. In this paper, the term
“subject” does not presuppose a human essence, nor does it depend on the transcendental
presupposition. Like Michel Foucault, I consider the subject to be a social or discursive
effect (Foucault 1977; 1980). According to Foucault, discourse has the constitutive
power of organizing the real world because it is connected to the complicity of the will
towards knowledge and power. The subject is not the source of meaning, power or
action, but a discursive construct; “the subject who knows, the objects to be known and
the modalities o f knowledge must be regarded as so many effects o f these fundamental
implications o f power-knowledge and their historical transformation” (Foucault 1977; 28).
Therefore, the notion o f the subject has its own history; each discourse produces its
subject and its subject reproduces the discourse and itself. Of course, discourse is
interwoven with the social and material apparatus to practice it. Foucault examined the
social and material apparatus of discourses such as prisons, schools, hospitals, and
asylums, through his genealogical method,
but I am mainly interested in the internal structure of discourse itself and its history. In
other words, my first interest is to analyze the modem history of the Western discourse on
the subject.
Modem Westem subjectivity has fostered a distinctive type o f individualism; “one
which treats the ego as the center not only o f theoretical cognition but o f social-political
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action and interaction” (Dallmayr 1981 : vxi). I am convinced that the ego as the center of
theoretical cognition refers to Enlightenment subjectivity while the ego as the center of
social-political action and interaction indicates Romantic subjectivity. The modem
Western notion of the subject was formed through the process of synthesis of these two
subjectivities. “[Mjodemity appears”, says Dallmayr, “characterized not only by its
reliance on the cognitive epistemological ego but its concern with the practical, or acting,
human subject” (Dallmayr 1981: 2). Cartesian disengaged reason is the extreme of the
former and Fichte’s self-positing spirit is the extreme of the latter.
In this sense, the Hegelian subject, I think, is the culmination of the notion of the
modem Westem subject. The Hegelian subject is the infinite Spirit or Geist who realizes
himself in matter and expresses his own purpose as well. This subject manifests himself in
man, the finite spirit, and man as the subject realizes himself in matter and expresses his
purpose as a vehicle o f Geist as well. The realization of himself presupposes the complete
knowledge of himself; without knowing himself, he can neither realize nor express himself.
Knowing himself cannot avoid knowing others as mirrors of himself. Others might be
other human beings as conscious beings or nature as a non-conscious being. Therefore,
the Hegelian subject at this stage, the subject of desire, has a strong compulsion of
knowing himself and others; without knowing himself and others he cannot express
himself nor realize his purpose as a vehicle of the absolute Spirit. Other human beings as a
vehicle of the absolute Spirit are the same. They aim to achieve mutual recognition, which
is possible only when each subject knows himself and the other. For Hegel, knowing
means conceptual knowing namely rational knowing. Only the rational being can know
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only the rational being. In his dialectic of master-slave, Hegel starts from the Cartesian
subject (1 = 1) and ends in the social subject who is recognized by the other social subject.
In order to achieve this mutual recognition, th e ‘T ’ as a rational being undergoes two
negations; first, th e ‘T ’ has to negate itself in order to desire and possess the difference of
the other as a rational being; second, the‘T ’ has to negate the unity o f th e ‘T ’ and the
other to return to the “L” The other also follows the same path. The reason why th e ‘T ’
goes to the other is only for mutual recognition, but this recognition is always delayed. I
am convinced that this movement rather results in mastering the other. The Hegelian
subject has been a basis of modem Westem politics. Marx discovered the revolutionary
potentiality from this dialectic and displaced “master” and “slave” with “bourgeoisie” and
“proletariat” (Kojeve 1969; Sartre 1956: 321; Hyppolite 1974: 172)^. Some modem
feminists also changed “master” and “slave” into “men” and “women” (Millett 1970; Rich
1976; Easton 1987). The liberation movement of the Third World also changed the words
into “imperialist” and “the colonized people.” But this is a logic o f exploitation and
mastering. This logic demands only self-consciousness as an entity separate from the
unconscious and other desire different from Hegelian desire. I will call this Hegelian
subject a modem Western masculine subject, who is characterized by the “conscious”
desire of mastering others and masquerading himself as a pursuer for mutual recognition.
Hegel’s subject of desire fimctions the same as Freud and Lacan’s ego: the former
tries to render the other the self-othering and the latter seeks to identify himself with the
other reflected in his ego. Both of them live in the world of sameness where the other is

For a discussion of different evaluation of this interpretation, see Arthur (1983).
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negated. And Hegel’s subject o f recognition is similar to Freud’s masculine subject or
Lacan’s speaking subject; it is distinguished by the “unconscious” desire of going back to
the lost paradise in fantasy. According to Freud, every subject undergoes the painful
experience o f detaching himself from the mother who was considered as its own body by
the subject. The formation o f the masculine subject or the establishment of the
identification with the position imposed by “the cultural” is a conscious striving to
compensate for the loss of the love-object, the mother, but it never expunges the
(unconscious) memory of unity with one’s own mother. This memory constitutes the
unconscious desire, which is always activated by the pain o f reality. The subject’s
unconscious desire is directed towards unity with its mother. Lacan further claims that the
speaking subject or the unconscious can regain the unity with his mother only in fantasy.
Thus I will call them modem Westem masculine subjects. In chapter 2 , 1 will examine
these masculine subjects which are produced by Hegelian, Freudian, and Lacanian
discourses.
Many feminists such as Luce Irigaray and Julia Kristeva show us that Westem
discourse is characterized by its masculine structure of narratives in which women are
defined as others. For them, psychoanalysis is a means to analyze the masculine narrative
structure o f Western discourse. Other feminists criticize them as dutiful daughters of
Lacan, who is considered the master of masculine discourse (Grosz 1990; 150), but I think
that they try to re-write the Oedipus complex, the symbol of masculine discourse. In
order to evaluate Irigaray and Kristeva, we have to examine how Freud and Lacan work
on female sexual identity, which is another name for the female subject, I think; they work
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within the discourse o f Freud and Lacan.
In chapter 3 ,1 will argue that while Freud shows us how the discourse on female
sexual identity is constructed under the privilege o f the penis, Lacan tells us that it is a
specific product of modem Westem ocuiarcentric and phallocentric culture. Freud did not
directly deal with the matter of the female subject; he was deeply imbued with male bias or
phallocentric culture. His discourses aimed to produce only the male subject, but
‘^mwittingly” produced new questions on female subjectivity. In my opinion, Freud
seemed to feel that he discovered or produced the Oedipal logic, which constituted the
human subject as well as the unconscious, as a “science.” By contrast, Lacan made it clear
that the Oedipal logic is not a science but a “discourse.” Then, if the Oedipal logic is a
kind o f discourse, it could be re-written. Both Irigaray and Kristeva, in my view, clearly
knew that the Oedipal logic is a discourse and tried to re-write it. In doing so, they made
new discourses, which would produce a new subject different from the male subject.
According to Irigaray, the new subject is women because they are ontologically different
from the masculine subject. By contrast, Kristeva draws the new subject from the subjectin-process. Both man and woman have the possibility of becoming the new subject by
practicing poetic language. This new subject is related to the subject of the unconscious
(Freud) or the subject of the Real (Lacan).
In chapter 4 , 1 will contend that the modem Western politics was characterized by
the politics o f identity and the politics of representation. While the former has been based
on the Hegelian subject o f desire, Freud’s ego, and Lacan’s M ol, the latter has been based
on the Hegelian subject o f recognition, Freud’s masculine subject and Lacan’s speaking
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subject. As an alternative for those politics, I will present the politics o f symptom which
aims to change something at the level of the symptom.
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CHAPTER 2

DISCOURSE ON MASCULINE SUBJECT

(A) Hegel; Conscious Desire of Mastering Others Delays Mutual Recognition
For Hegel, the subject has two related dimensions; a rational animal (a living being
who thinks) and an expressive being (a being whose thinking always and necessarily
expresses itself in media) (Taylor 1975; 83). The subject as a rational being recognizes an
idea imposed by Geist or the final cause as his own. The subject as an expressive being
externalizes and realizes himself in the matter; “man comes to know himself by expressing
and hence clarifying what he is and recognizing himself in this expression” (Taylor 1975:
17). Therefore, the Hegelian subject is an embodied spirit. Through realizing himself he
achieves his self-knowledge, the True; realization and knowing are inseparable.
The Hegelian subject has not his fixed essential nature; through expressing his
purpose in life, he achieves his essence as a finite spirit. He is always in the process of
movement in order to acquire the True. This implies that the Hegelian subject moves
towards a certain direction, the True. The reason why the Hegelian subject can move is
that he is a living substance; “the living Substance is being which in truth Subject, or, what
is the same, is in truth actual only in so far as it is the movement of positing itself or is the
mediation of its self-othering with itself’ (Hegel 1977; 10). Only the living substance can
14
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move because it has its own contradiction. God as the universe cannot move because it is
the eternal sameness with itself. God as the universe cannot present the True as the
movement of reflecting itself into itself. By contrast, the subject as the living substance
can posit the True as the subject as well as the movement o f reflecting itself onto itself.
“This Substance”, says Hegel, “is, as Subject, pure, simple negativity, and is for this very
reason the bifurcation o f this simple; it is the doubling which sets up opposition, and then
again the negation of this indifferent diversity and of its antithesis [the immediate
simplicity]” (Hegel 1977: 10).
According to Hegel, the True is a closed, circular world, which is achieved by the
subject as a self-restoring sameness: “It [The True] is the process of its own becoming, the
circle that presupposes its end and its goal, having its end also as its beginning; and only
by being worked out to its end, is it actual” (Hegel 1977: 10). Therefore, the Hegelian
subject travels towards a definite end, knowing the whole processes of its travel. The
meaning of the process of its travel is one o f the essential moments of achieving the True.
Put another way, each process consists o f the whole process of achieving the True.
Therefore, the Hegelian world o f the True consists of the necessary moments: “each
moment is necessary; and furthermore, each moment has to be lingered over, because
each is itself a complete individual shape, and one is only viewed in absolute perspective
when its determinateness is regarded as a concrete whole, or the whole is regarded as
uniquely qualified by that determination” (Hegel 1977; 17).
Only the Spiritual can move because it knows the whole process of its own
movement toward the True. The travel proceeds fi’om in-itself to for-itself. Where the
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world of in-itself is one of the sense-consciousness, the world of for-itself is one o f selfconsciousness. The unified world of in-itself and for-itself is one of the Spiritual. Hegel’s
purpose is to trace this travel fi'om in-itself to for-itself; “It is this coming-to-be of Science
as such or of knowledge, that is described in this Phenomenology o f S p irif (Hegel 1977;
15). From the viewpoint of civilization, this is to describe the process of being constituted
in culture. But, fi'om the viewpoint o f subjectification, which is expressed as
“socialization” in role theory of sociology, each single individual who is at first senseconsciousness develops into the subject of a given society. In the role theory o f American
sociology, each individual becomes a member of a given society through socialization. In
my opinion, Hegel “sociologically” proposed the problem of “socialization” or
“subjectification”, but he solved it “philosophically” or “ideally.”
In Phenomenology o f the Spirit, Hegel begins his first chapter by naming it
“Consciousness.” More clearly stated, he starts from “consciousness.” Before becoming
the subject, the human is “already” consciousness which has not yet contents. Hegel does
not explain the genesis of consciousness. Therefore, consciousness is transhistorical; it
has no genetic history. In the beginning, consciousness is pure negativity without having
any contents. This aspect of “Consciousness” is similar to the Cartesian Cogito. For
Hegel, as an heir to the Enlightenment, consciousness as a capacity of conceptual
reasoning is the peculiar feature of the human being. For Hegel, man as a conscious being
is an apex of the hierarchy of beings (Taylor 1975; 80-87). But, Hegel as a successor to
Romanticism also thinks that consciousness is always consciousness about something
(Williams 1992). Therefore, consciousness is said to contain two moments of knowing
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and the objectivity negative to its subjective knowing. In other words, consciousness
contains the activity itself and the objectivity opposite to that activity; knowing is always
to know what it is. As a result, there is disparity between them in consciousness; “The
disparity which exists in consciousness between the T’ and the substance which is its
object is the distinction between them, the negative in general” (Hegel 1977: 21).
Then we come to ask: where does the force to objectify‘T ’ come from? Is ‘T ’
who sees the “F’ as an object the same as the‘T ’ who is seen as the object? To the first
question, Hegel answers “ideally” : “Consciousness...is explicitly the Notion o f itself.
Hence it is something that goes beyond limits, and since these limits are its own, it is
something that goes beyond itself’ (Hegel 1977: 51). Consciousness as “F’ who sees the
“F’ as an object is not genetically explained, but defined transcendentally. This
consciousness is originally supposed to go beyond itself. Without this idealism, the travel
of the Hegelian subject to the True cannot begin. With this idealism, Hegel answers the
second question: “consciousness is, on the one hand, consciousness of the object, and on
the other, consciousness of itself; consciousness of what for it is the True, and
consciousness of its knowledge o f the truth” (Hegel 1977: 54). Therefore, “F’ who sees
the “F’ as an object is the same as the “F’ who is seen as an object; the latter is actually
“something that is the in-itself only for consciousness” (Hegel 1977: 55). Both of them,
namely, the Cartesian subject and the social subject, are dialectically integrated in
consciousness. But Hegel does not explain to us how the Cartesian subject is generated,
and he demonstrates how it becomes integrated into the social subject, using the dialectic
of master-slave.
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Consciousness is its knowledge of itself as well as its object. They are in the
process of dialectical movement through which a new and true object called “experience”
appears. Hegel, therefore, calls consciousness the Notion of itself, which means ± e
movement of knowing. What is important here is the nature of the object of
consciousness. The object is the in-itself as well as the being-for-consciousness of this initself. The latter is a secondary object, which is the reflection of consciousness onto itself.
The first object as the in-itself is altered for consciousness. Every object “ceases to be the
in-itself and becomes something that is the in-itself only for consciousness” (Hegel 1977:
55). Hegel contends that the inquiry o f consciousness (“the Science of the experience of
consciousness”) is also one of the real or historical world because consciousness contains
consciousness itself as well as its object. From the viewpoint of Hegel, the development
of consciousness is the same as one of the real world.
Let’s summarize the things discussed thus far: 1) Hegel presupposes consciousness
as the movement of knowing; 2) consciousness contains its two objects, itself and the
object for consciousness; 3) the disparity between the two objects of consciousness
instigates the dialectical movement of consciousness toward the world of the True, where
appearance becomes identical with essence. In my opinion, Hegel’s dialectics is based on
the transcendental assumption of consciousness as the movement of knowing. Why
should consciousness know itself and its object? What forces consciousness into
compulsion to know itself and its object? In what follows, I will demonstrate that
consciousness’ compulsion of knowing is propelled by the notion of the human being as a
vehicle of Geist. Knowing itself and its object leads to its realization as a finite spirit in
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media, namely, others. If we follow Hegel’s dialectic, this will be accomplished only when
mutual recognition is achieved. But mutual recognition is always delayed; rather,
domination and submission prevail. I will examine why this paradox appears.
Now, let’s follow the travel o f Hegelian consciousness. The first objects of
consciousness belong to the world of sense; “The knowledge or knowing which is at the
start or immediately our object cannot be anything else but immediate knowledge itself a
knowledge of the immediate or o f what simply /s” (Hegel 1977: 58). Consciousness only
knows what is, and therefore, it achieves sense-certainty that something is. But sensecertainty is not true certainty because it depends on time (now) and space (here). The I’s
sense-certainty can differ fi’om another’s sense-certainty because the first I occupies
different time and space firom another I. When the I “sees” a tree, the I has a sensecertainty that a tree is. But another I can have other sense-certainty: “I, this T’, sees the
tree and asserts that ‘Here’ is a tree; but another ‘I’ sees the house and maintains that
‘Here’ is not a tree but a house instead. Both truths have the same authentication, viz. the
immediacy of seeing, and the certainty and assurance that both have about their knowing;
but the one truth vanishes on the other” (Hegel 1977: 61). When the I turns its sight, a
tree disappears and the I s sense-certainty also vanishes. But the fact that the I sees itself
remains. A tree or a house that the I sees is the universal because it really designates
“Here” and “Now” . Anything can be seen by the f and therefore, the concrete objects
disappear but “This” belonging to “Here” and “Now” remains. In this sense, Hegel
opposes realism and empiricism which assert that the existence of external objects has
absolute certainty and truth.
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Sense-certainty develops into perception because th e ‘T ’ realizes that sensecertainty actually comes from Fs consciousness. The difference between sense-certainty
and perception is as follows: “Immediate certainty does not take over the truth, for its
truth is the universal, whereas certainty wants to apprehend the This. Perception, on the
other hand, takes what is present to it as a universal” (Hegel 1977: 67). For perception,
both ‘F and the object are universal. While the object o f sense is the This (“the sensuous
world”), the object o f perception is a determinate Nothing, the Nothing of the This (“the
supersensible world”). Nothing negates the This, but also preserves it because Nothing is
the negation of the This: “Our Nothing, as the Nothing o f the This, preserves its
immediacy and is itself sensuous, but it is a universal immediacy” (Hegel 1977: 68). Why
Nothing is a universal immediacy is that the This is mediated and negated by
consciousness. From a sensuous being the object turns into a universal, but this universal
is essentially conditioned by it because this universal originates in the sensuous.
Therefore, this universality, called “the absolute universal” , cannot remain identical with
itself from which the universality splits into the extremes of “singular individuality” (the
One o f properties) and “universality” (the Also of the free matters).
The absolute universal is in the process of double movement: from universality to
singular individuality, which is the expression of Force, and in turn from singular
individuality to universality, which is Force proper. Through this movemenf the absolute
universal purges the antithesis between the universal and the individual and becomes the
object of the Understanding: “there now opens up above the sensuous world, which is the
world o f appearance, a supersensible world which henceforth is the true world, above the
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vanishing present world there opens up a permanent beyond” (Hegel 1977: 87). For
Understanding, everything is at first a Force, which is nothing but the concept, the thought
o f the sensuous world. Force is the reflection of this world back on itself or its reflection
in consciousness. Therefore, the world of Understanding is one of law. At first,
phenomena, which belongs to the sensuous world, and law, which belongs to the
supersensible world, seem to be opposites, but they identify with each other in the thought
o f “infinity.” Infinity is the universal life of the absolute which remains as itself in its other
and reconciles the one and the many. At that moment, consciousness of the other has
become a consciousness o f itself in the other. In its object, consciousness reaches itself; in
its truth, it is self-certainty, self-consciousness: “It is true that consciousness o f an ‘other’,
of an object in general, is itself necessarily self-consciousness, a reflectedness-into-itself,
consciousness of itself in its otherness” (Hegel 1977: 102).
At last, consciousness reaches the stage of self-consciousness. Consciousness as a
pure negativity, at first, tries to know the sensuous world external to itself and then seems
to achieve sense-certainty. But this sense-certainty proves to be false because the
sensuous thing is only a universal. Thus, consciousness moves toward the stage of
perception, in which I’s consciousness as well as its object are the universal. But, this
universal splits into two extremes of singular individuality and universality because it
originated in the sensuous world. Force, which instigates the double movement
(extemalization and internalization), enhances consciousness fi'om the sensuous world (the
world o f phenomena) to the supersensible world (the world o f laws). The opposition
between them is solved in infinity, where each extreme is the precondition o f the other’s
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existence. Consciousness of an “other” or object in general equals self-consciousness or
consciousness of itself in its otherness. In the stage of self-consciousness, “What the
object immediately was in itself —mere being in sense-certainty, the concrete thing of
perception, and for the Understanding, a Force —proves to be in truth, not this at all;
instead, this in-itself turns out to be a mode in which the object is only for an other”
(Hegel 1977: 104).
If all objects are only for an other, in-itself is equal to for-itself. Only selfconsciousness is in-itself as well as for-itself:
If we give the name of Notion to the movement of knowing, and the name
of object to knowing as a passive unity, or as the T’, then we see that not
only for us, but for knowing itself the object corresponds to the
Notion...For the in-itself is consciousness; but equally it is that fo r which
an other (the in-itself) is consciousness; and it is fo r consciousness that the
in-itself of the objecf and the being of the object for an other, are one and
the same; the T’ is the content o f the connection and connecting itself.
Opposed to an other, the T’ is its own self and at the same time it
overarches this other which, for the ‘F, is equally only the ‘F itself (Hegel
1977: 104).
Self-consciousness is the reflection out of the being o f the world of sense and
perception, and is essentially the return from otherness. This movement of selfconsciousness is activated by the desire for achieving the unity of self-consciousness with
itself. Therefore, “self-consciousness is Desire in general” (Hegel 1977: 105). Selfconsciousness has double objects: the immediate object and itself. Unlike the object of
sense-certainty and perception, the immediate object of self-consciousness is a living thing.
Life. Self-consciousness learns through experience that the object is independent. In
another word, the object of self-consciousness is also another self-consciousness.
According to Hegel, self-consciousness, before ascending to the stage of mutual
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recognition, is the desire in general to achieve its own certainty through superseding other
self-consciousness. Nothing except other self-consciousness can give certainty to selfconsciousness because it is not a living thing. Life; “self-consciousness is thus certain o f
itself only by superseding this other that presents itself to self-consciousness as an
independent life; self-consciousness is Desire” (Hegel 1977; 109). Thus, selfconsciousness tries to destroy other self-consciousness: “Certain of the nothingness o f this
other, it explicitly afBrms that this nothingness is for it the truth of the other; it destroys
the independent object and thereby gives itself the certainty of itself as a true certainty, a
certainty which has become explicit for self-consciousness itself in an objective manner”
(Hegel 1977: 109).
In my opinion, the “desire” o f self-consciousness follows a logic o f exploiting and
mastering others. It is similar to Hobbes’s natural human being; Hobbes’s natural man
suffers perpetual and restless desire for power because power is the essential requirement
for felicity, self-interest (Hobbes 1955). It is also similar to Freud’s reality-ego or egoinstinct whose principal function is self-preservation: “the reality-ego need do nothing but
strive for what is useful and guard itself against damage” (Freud [1911]: 18). The travel
o f consciousness from sense-certainty to the desire of self-consciousness is activated by
the will to master others although it is embellished as a stage toward the True, the unity of
consciousness with itself in other.
But the movement does not end here because the I’s self-consciousness is faced by
another self-consciousness. Hegel’s dialectic needs two subjects, or two selfconsciousness; the self-consciousness of the T’ can be recognized only by ‘another’ self

R ep ro d u ced with p erm ission o f th e copyright ow ner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission.

24

consciousness; “Self-consciousness exists in and for itself when, and by the fact, it so
exists for another; that is, it exists only in being acknowledged” (Hegel 1977; III). Hegel
calls this movement of self-consciousness “the process o f Recognition.” The I demands
another I to recognize the first I (I’s value) as its value. So does another selfconsciousness. This process of recognition involves two directions: “Self-consciousness is
faced by another self-consciousness; it has come out of itself. This has a two-fold
significance: first, it has lost itself for it finds itself as an other being; secondly, in doing so
it has superseded the other, for it does not see the other as an essential being, but in the
other sees its own self’ (Hegel 1977: 111). While the first movement refers to the loss of
itself the second movement designates the supersession of other. The reason why the I
loses itself is to supersede other: this is a circular movement. This is a movement of
seeking “the death of the other”: “the relation of the two self-conscious individuals is such
that they prove themselves and each other through a life-and-death struggle. They must
engage in this struggle, for they must raise their certainty of being for themselves to truth,
both in the case o f the other and in their own case” (Hegel 1977: 113-14).
Why should two self-conscious individuals struggle against each other? Because
they want their certainty of being for themselves to be the truth. Why should selfconsciousness achieve its certainty? For the True, in which “T’ that is ‘We’ and ‘We’ that
is ‘I’” (Hegel 1977: 110). At last, the pursuit of the True turns out to be a main
mechanism of justifying the exploitation o f others. The pursuit for the True results in a
paradoxical situation. Therefore, the movement of exploiting and mastering others must
be changed to the stage of mutual recognition in which I is We and We is I. How does
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Hegel explain this transition from exploitation to mutual recognition?
Hegel explains the process of recognition through the story of the so-called
master-bondsman. In the beginning, there is inequality between a master and a bondsman,
“Since to begin with they are unequal and opposed, and their reflection into a unity has not
yet been achieved, they exist as two opposed shapes of consciousness; one is the
independent consciousness whose essential nature is to be for itself, the other is the
dependent consciousness whose essential nature is simply to live or to be for another”
(Hegel 1977: 115). The “F’ desires the other because the other is a difference, but as soon
as the “F’ achieves its desire, the difference of the ‘other’ self-consciousness disappears.
This result is a paradox because the “F’ desires the other’s difference. This is a destiny of
the master. The master’s self-consciousness cannot be recognized by the slave because
the difference of the slave is already negated by the master. But the slave increasingly
discovers that he has a self-consciousness during the process of “work” or labor. The
object of work, nature, is different with the slave, but he externalizes himself onto the
object and overcomes the difference. Yet, the product of the slave’s labor is enjoyed by
the master. At this time, the slave realizes that the force of overcoming the difference of
nature is his own;
Through work... the bondsman becomes conscious of what he truly
is ..Work...is desire held in check, fleetingness staved off; in other words,
work forms and shapes the thing. The negative relation to the objects
becomes its form and something permanent, because it is precisely for the
worker the object has independence. This negative middle term or the
formative activity is at the same time the individuality or pure being-for-self
of consciousness which now, in the work outside of it, acquires an element
of permanence. It is in this way, therefore, that consciousness, qua
worker, comes to see in the independent being [of the object] its own
independence (Hegel 1977: 118).

R ep ro d u ced with p erm ission o f the copyright ow ner. Further reproduction prohibited w ithout p erm ission.

26

At this moment the real dialectic o f the master and slave starts. Hegel explains the
development of self-consciousness as the division of self-consciousness (stoicism,
skepticism, and the unhappy consciousness), the development o f reason from the unhappy
consciousness, and the advent of absolute knowledge.
The pivotal point is what drives the transition from desire to recognition. As the
dialectic o f master-bondsman shows, two self-consciousnesses at the stage of desire risk
their lives in order to satisfy their desires. Therefore, struggle and opposition is
unavoidable; two self-consciousnesses have their immediate self-certainty (1 = 1). This
immediate self-certainty is nothing but a conscious, rational understanding of himself, that
is a Cartesian Cogito. This self-consciousness is, if we use Sartre’s term, the ego or
“reflective consciousness” (Sartre 1957). But, faced by another self-consciousness, the I’s
self-certainty trembles. Therefore, the I tries to reduce another I to self-othering, which
means to the I’s projection of his self-certainty to another I. Another I also does the same
thing. If the first I succeeds, another 1 is degenerated into a thing without consciousness,
and vice-versa. In the process of struggling, two self-consciousnesses come to know that
their persistence in their immediate self-certainties would result in the other’s death as well
as in the nullification of possibility of recognition from the other conscious being. At this
moment, the two self-consciousnesses are ready to desert their immediate self-certainties
and to let the other be. Butler says that “otherness is surpassed every time that one selfconsciousness discovers the Other not as a limit to freedom but as its very condition”
(Butler 1987: 86). At last, the stage of mutual recognition appears. Williams summarizes
as follows: “The self must ‘return’ to itself out of its ‘othered’ state, by winning itself in
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the other’s recognition. This return to self out of otherness is not simply a restoration o f
the original self-identity qua abstract immediate identity. Rather the original self-certainty
is enlarged and enriched by the other’s recognition. But this enriching return to self is
possible only if the self in turn releases the other and allows the other to go free” (Williams
1992; 149). According to Hegel, this is a “necessary” development of human history.
But this “logical reasoning” is just a way to explain the transition from desire to
mutual recognition. The I’s realization that other’s difference is a precondition o f fulfilling
the Ts desire for recognition logically leads to I’s giving-up of I’s immediate self-certainty.
In this explanation, I’s rational reasoning is assumed to be directly connected to action.
Yet, I think that Hegelian dialectics contains an intrinsic obstacle to this. First,
Hegel argues for the hierarchy o f being; he degenerates other beings that do not have
consciousness into lower beings. Only man is conscious; man is most characterized by his
consciousness. Although Hegel does not think that man is a simple sum of consciousness
and matter, he narrows life into abstraction and nature into things without consciousness.
Hegel starts from consciousness, excluding other aspects of the human psyche. Second,
this logic demands only self-consciousness as an entity separate from the unconscious and
nature. For Hegel, self-conscious means that a human being is able to “authentically”
know and express himself and further realize himself in others. But self-consciousness is a
second construct, or more precisely, a fictitious construct. In this sense, Hyppolite and
Sartre are important. Hyppolite’s notion of time informs us that the subject cannot avoid
the temporal basis o f its identity. Butler summarizes as follows; “For Hyppolite, time
constitutes human reality as an ek-static enterprise, a mode of permanent self
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estrangement. Living in time, human beings are necessarily other to themselves, not only
because they cannot inhabit memory and anticipation at once, but because time itself is
necessarily beyond their control; indeed, time is less a human creation than the necessary
limit on all human creativity, the inevitable transience of all human creations” (Butler
1987: 82). Whenever the subject reflects on his consciousness and gains his selfconsciousness, his self-consciousness is estranged by uncontrollable time. Sartre further
contends that consciousness can never become self-consciousness except in the imaginary:
“consciousness never becomes self-consciousness, but remains ontologically estranged,
overcoming this estrangement only through the momentary enchantments of desire’s
imaginary satisfaction” (Butler 1987: 97). Third, therefore, the I’s self-consciousness
carmot totally grasp “life” because life is always more than self-consciousness. In other
words, the I’s self-consciousness or the Fs conscious self cannot totally grasp its life nor
other’s life. Fourth, the Fs self-consciousness has a strong “compulsion” of consciously
knowing itself as well as others, which is brought on and exacerbated by its failure to
totally grasp itself and others. The Fs self-consciousness strives to achieve more inclusive
self-consciousness or identity by virtue o f negating others. Fifth, the Fs selfconsciousness tends to reduce others to self-othering or self-sameness; the Fs selfconsciousness cannot tolerate something other than consciousness. Therefore, the I
always returns to itself out of “self-othering”, not other itself. This is not a world that
Hegel intended to bring about: Hegel originally holds that the I return to itself out of other
itself not self-othering (Williams 1992: chapter 7). This world is not characterized by
mutual recognition, but domination and submission. Without deserting his conscious
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pursuit for rational knowledge o f himself as well as others, the Hegelian subject o f desire
cannot arrive at the stage o f mutual recognition.
Another way to explain the transition from desire to mutual recognition might be
the “contract of egoistic individuals.” This is a Hobbesian way. According to Hobbes, the
original condition of man was that o f a creature living in a state o f nature, in which he was
in constant conflict with his fellows. He lived in a perpetual state of fear. For each man,
surrounded by his enemies, death is more likely than felicity. Therefore, every man
surrenders some of his natural right in order to pursue his own felicity. The rights
surrendered by each individual (to pursue their own self-interest as if they were alone in
the world) are transferred in the form of a contract or covenant; “I transfer to X my
natural right to the free exercise o f my will and authorize him to act on my belief on
condition that you make a similar transfer and give a similar authority” (Hobbes 1955;
xxxviii). The fundamental force that drives each individual to surrender his natural right is
his self-interest. But this is far away from the Hegelian world of mutual recognition.
An alternative way I want to propose is the deconstruction of the Hegelian subject
of desire. The Hegelian subject o f desire has to realize that he is strongly obsessed with a
compulsion of “consciously” knowing himself as well as others. He has to admit that it is
impossible to completely know himself and others. This demands the deconstruction o f
the Hegelian subject of desire. In fact, Hegel suggests that the subject o f desire trembles
when he is faced by another subject of desire. But even if the subject o f desire is
deconstructed, it cannot achieve mutual recognition. The failure of achieving mutual
recognition in Hegel’s master-slave dialectic can be explained in psychoanalytic terms.
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In “Independence and Dependence of Self-consciousness; Lordship and Bondage”,
Hegel states as follows;
Self-consciousness is faced by another self-consciousness; it has come out
o f itself. This has a twofold significance; first, it has lost itself for it finds
itself as an other being; secondly, in doing so it has superseded the other,
for it does not see the other as an essential being, but in the other sees its
own self (Hegel 1977; 111)
These paragraphs can be read as they explain the process o f “projective identification.”
The term “projective identification”, introduced by Melanie Klein, refers to “a mechanism
revealed in phantasies in which the subject inserts his self —in whole or in part —into the
object in order to harm, possess or control it” (Laplanche and Pontalis 1973; 356). The
first self-consciousness projects its ego onto other self-consciousness and then, identifies
its ego (projected onto the other self-consciousness) as its own. Ver Eecke also points
out; “the other is not constituted as another self-consciousness. The other is only
constituted as a projection of the self-consciousness that the first consciousness has not
yet become of in itself’ (Ver Eecke 1983; 121). The important thing is here that its ego,
according to Lacan, is modeled on its imago or other’s imago, the process of which
always leaves remainders. Thus, the process o f projective identification always
presuppose the splitting of the subject; the ego and the remainders. As a result, selfconsciousness cannot be totally aware of itself; it is alienated. The first self-consciousness
is reduced into its parf the ego and the other self-consciousness into self-othering of the
first self-consciousness, not other itself; “the first [self-consciousness] does not know
itself but on the contrary it has falsely discovered itself in another being and therefore has
founded itself as another bein^' (Ver Eecke 1983; 121). From the beginning, in this
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sense, Hegelian dialectic, which aims to establish mutual recognition, is destined to failure.
The next paragraph can be also read as an explaination of the process of
“introjection.”
It must supersede this otherness of itself. This is the supersession of the
first ambiguity, and is therefore itself a second ambiguity. First, it must
proceed to supersede the other independent being in order thereby to
become certain of itself as the essential being; secondly, in so doing it
proceeds to supersede its own self, for this other is itself (Hegel 1977:
111).
The term “introjection”, which is introduced by Sandor Ferenczi, generally refers to the
process that “in fantasy, the subject transposes objects and their inherent qualities from the
‘outside’ to the ‘inside’ of himself’ (Laplanche and Pontalis 1973: 356). This is the
process o f regaining the projected ego from the self-othering.
What the processes of projection and introjection mean is that they are fictitious
processes proceeded in fantasy, presupposing the self-alienation. Therefore, Hegel’s
dialectic o f two self-consciousnesses is from the start far away from the mutual
recognition. As it will be clear in the chapter on Lacan, the dialectic based on the
ficticious ego or the self-consciousness alienated from itself results in only the world of
sameness where the other should be negated and mastered. When this ego is
deconstructed , the subject of recognition is divided from the subject of desire and it takes
the position imposed by the cultural as its own. This is another alienation. The alienated
subject o f recognition strives to acquire its recognition from others in the circuit of the
social system, but it can recognize the alienated other subject and be recognized by it. The
true mutual recognition is, therefore, impossible. Hegel’s subject of recognition is a
floating subject who always begins to travel in order to achieve mutual recognition.
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Speaking in terms o f Lacanian psychoanalysis, the subject o f desire is the ego and
the subject of recognition is the speaking subject. The subject o f desire lives in the world
of sameness where the imaginary unity with the other maintains. On the contrary, the
subject o f recognition lives in the circuit of signifiera where it strives to regain, in fantasy,
the lost unity.
The subject of desire or the ego cannot achieve his conscious self-consciousness; it
fimctions on the basis of imaginary identification, namely self-estrangement. Ver Eecke
says, “Inasmuch as Lacan claims that the synthesis achieved in the mirror stage is a
foundation, a basis for further syntheses (or identifications), Lacan’s theory presents us
with a view of man in which an unconscious, alien identity is the basis of any further
psychological development. Within such a fi’amework, the Hegelian dream of conscious
self-possession is radically impossible” (Ver Eecke 1983; 126). The subject of recognition
or the speaking subject also cannot achieve mutual recognition; it is an alienated existence
in/by way o f language. Elliott points out as follows; “With the introduction of the
symbolic...Lacan argues that mutual recognition is absolutely unobtainable since the Other
introduces an uncertainty, and interminable shifting, into language” (EUiott 1992; 138).
Hegelian politics originally aimed to secure the independent individual who is in
harmony with the social order, and which has been the basis for modem Western politics
as well as the politics of anti-colonial nationalist movements in the Third World. The
independent individual requires fi’eedom, whereas the social order needs necessity. Hegel
solves the fi’eedom-necessity problem by proposing a society in which the differences of
individuals are overcome. In this society, ‘T ’ is “We” and “We” is “I.” This society
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would be based on the mutual recognition of individuals. Human history will be complete
in this society. Marxist politics as a modified heir o f Hegelian politics has tried to achieve
this goal all over the world. But, unfortunately, the advent of the truly free society is
always delayed.
We may characterize the modem era as one o f imperialism and colonialism. All
civilizations were defined as others by Westem civilization. Westem civilization based on
the capacity o f the human subject (actually, the Hegelian subject of desire) negated other
civilizations in the name of the truth. World Wars I and H suggest that this Hegelian
subject of desire is destined to destroy humanity as well as nature. Another Hegelian
subject, the subject of recognition or the speaking subject emerged in the process of the
liberation movement of the Third World. The Westem subject was forced to recognize
that the Third World is also another subject, which opened neo-colonialism. Both o f them
strove to achieve mutual recognition, which is destined to fail; they in fact strove to
regain, in fantasy, the lost imaginary unity.
Therefore, we need to find alternative notions of the subject. In my view,
psychoanalysis, especially Lacanian psychoanalysis, can be the starting point. That is why
we have to re-read Freud.

(B) Freud: Unconscious Desire of Regaining the Lost Paradise
When I connect Hegel with Freud, I take the ego as the connecting link. I think
that Hegel’s subject of desire has the same fimction as Freud’s “ego.” Hegel’s subject of
desire is characterized by the facts that: 1) it disguises itself as an independent and
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autonomous substance; 2) in order to survive it needs other subjects of desire as matter
which should be consumed by it; 3) it represses and negates others in the name of selfcertainty or self-sameness. In similar ways, Freud’s “ego” is distinguished by the fact that:
1) it masquerades itself as an autonomous and masterful agency; 2) it tries to unify,
homogenize, and organize itself as well as others; 3) it represses the unconscious wishful
impulses which would generate unpleasure in the human psyche and resists the endeavor
of the repressed unconscious to become conscious. If we consider Hegel’s subject of
desire or Freud’s ego as a subject, the discourse of this subject is characterized by the
conscious and intentional discourse: “From the viewpoint of the self or ego, T’ runs the
show: that aspect of us that we call T’ believes that it knows what it thinks and feels, and
believes that it knows why it does what it does” (Fink 1995: 4). But, according to Freud,
there is some other kind of discourse stemming from the unconscious, which is
unintentional and unconscious discourse. Therefore, Hegel’s subject of desire or Freud’s
ego cannot completely know what it thinks and feels, nor why it does what it does.
Freud’s metapsychology or topography of the mental apparatus tells us that the
ego cannot represent the subject. The ego is not a pregiven entity. The ego emerges from
id and plays a fundamental role in making the masculine subject who identifies himself
with the position imposed by the social code or the Oedipal logic in Westem culture. In
what follows, I will demonstrate that the psyche cannot be the same as the conscious or
Hegel’s consciousness, that the human psyche consists of systems of psychical apparatus,
and that each system is always in conflict. After that, I will illustrate that in Western
culture the so-called Oedipus complex has been a maker of the unconscious wishes as well
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as the masculine subject, and that this masculine subject, who conceals his unconscious
desire for regaining the pre-Oedipal dyadic relation with his mother, has been considered
to be the subject.
1.

Metapsychology; Two Models of Mental Apparatus

In The Interpretation o f Dreams {1900), Freud says, “a dream is a (disguised)
fulfillment o f a (suppressed or repressed) wish” (Freud [1900]: 194). When we read this
statement, we come to ask the following: why should a dream fulfill its wish only in a
disguised form? Why should dream’s wish be suppressed or repressed? Who suppresses
or represses a dream’s wish? If it is true that a dream’s wish is represented to
consciousness only in a disguised form, we cannot avoid admitting that there must be
another agency or area different firom consciousness.
In order to verify the statement mentioned above, Freud analyzes a lot o f dreams,
and at last provides the topography of human psyche. In chapter VU “The Psychology of
the Dream-Process”, Freud divides the mind into three areas —memory, the unconscious,
and the preconscious.

Preconscious
Unconscious

Perception
Mnemic traces

Motor
Response
Diagram 1.
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This topography indicates as well two temporary conditions connected with the operations
o f the psyche —perception and motor response (diagram I above).
According to Freud, all human psychical activity starts from stimuli and ends in the
innervations (a certain energy is transported to a particular part of the body where it brings
about motor or sensory phenomena) and therefore, human psyche has a sense or direction.
To the left o f the diagram 1, there is perception, which leaves a memory trace; “A trace is
left in our psychical apparatus of the perceptions which impinge upon it. This we may
describe as a ‘memory trace’; and to the function relating to it we give the name of
memory” (Freud [1900]; 576). Here Freud distinguishes sensory (perceptual) from motor
pole o f the psychical apparatus. Our perceptions are linked with one another in our
memory, which is called “association” by Freud. These perceptions are preserved in our
memory, and they are transferred into the conscious by some moments. Memory traces
which are not repressed can enter into the area of the conscious without distortion, but
memory traces which are repressed cannot enter into the area of the conscious without
distortion. The unconscious, thus, is a part of the mind not accessible to consciousness
except in disguised form. For the unconscious materials to enter into consciousness, they
have to pass through the preconscious to the conscious; “it [the unconscious] has no
access to consciousness except via the preconscious, in passing through which its
excitatory process is obliged to submit to modification” (Freud [1900]; 580).
The movement of a stimulus from sensation to motility (discharge of excitations
into the external world) is precisely structured by the form of the wish; the path of an
impulse from passive reception to active expression is the wish-form. This wish always
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strives to be represented, but in daily life some wishes cannot find their path to be
represented because o f censorship: “Experience shows us that this path leading through
the preconscious to consciousness is barred to the dream-thoughts during the daytime by
the censorship imposed by resistance” (Freud [1900]: 580-81). In the daytime, psyche
apparatus has a “progressive” direction fi'om perception to consciousness, but in the
nighttime it has a “regressive” direction fi'om consciousness to perception: “In regression
the fabric of the dream-thoughts is resolved into its raw material” (Freud [1900]: 582). In
the nighttime censorship decreases, and therefore, the wish can find its way of being
represented.
What is important in this topography is that there is an unending dialectic of
psychical conflict between repression and the surreptitious ways in which unconscious
representations press toward expression (Elliott 1992: 16). To Freud, the human psyche is
neither a transparent entity, nor a pacific state. It is always in the process of conflict.
Human psyche has direction, but unlike Hegel who asserts that consciousness has only an
ascending direction toward the True, Freud holds that human psyche has the two
directions of “progression” and “regression.” In the regressive direction, the repressed
unconscious tries to be represented in the area of the conscious, but it is thwarted by
censorship. Then, who exercises censorship? According to Freud, resistance does. Who
is the agent of resistance? In this article, Freud does not clearly answer this question.
Later, in The Ego and the A/ (1923) Freud says that the agency of repression and
resistance is the coherent ego (Freud [1923a]: 8), but in this article he just says that
resistance is exercised by endopsychic force (Freud [1900]: 308). The unconscious as a
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psychical system deforms, disfigures, and disguises meanings and makes it something
unrecognizable in order to avoid censorship. Distortion is a global force through which
the unconscious transforms and produces psychical expression. This distortion is achieved
by four unconscious mechanisms; “condensation”, “displacement”, “consideration o f
representation”, and “secondary revision” (Freud [1900]: chapter VT).
When Freud uses the topological metaphor of mental apparatus, he warns that we
do not have to hypothesize that the psychical systems are actually arranged in a “spatial”
order. In other words, we do not have to suppose that each system of psychical apparatus
has its fixed position. Each system of psychical apparatus is always in processes: “Thus
we are driven to conclude that two fundamentally different kinds of psychical process are
concerned in the formation of dreams. One of these produces perfectly rational dreamthoughts, of no less validity than normal thinking; while the other treats these thoughts in a
manner which is in the highest degree bewildering and irrational” (Freud [1900]: 636).
Freud associates the unconscious with what he calls the “primary process” and the
preconscious with what he calls the “secondary process.” ‘ The primary and secondary
processes represent two very different ways of responding to the pleasure principle.^

*. In the Projectfo r a Scientific Psychology of 1895, Freud already elaborated the
conceptions o f the primary and secondary processes. Freud’s earlier researches were
based on the assumption of psychic energy. As an apparatus for mastering excitation, the
mind exhibits the double function o f investment and discharge of quantities of energies.
On the one hand, the mind strives to completely discharge energies, which is called the
principle of neuronic inertia. On the other hand, the mind seeks constancy and stabilty of
energy, which called the principle o f constancy.
^ . In Beyond the Pleasure Principle, Freud defines the pleasure principle as follows: “The
pleasure principle...is a tendency operating in the service o f function whose business it is
to firee the mental apparatus entirely fi’om excitation or to keep the amount of excitation in
it constant or to keep it as low as possible” (Freud [1920]: 76).
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While the primary process seeks immediate gratification through hallucination (a
“perceptual identity”), the secondary process traces a more circuitous route to
gratification (a “thought identity”): “The primary process endeavors to bring about a
discharge o f excitation in order that, with the help of the amount of excitation thus
accumulated, it may establish a ‘perceptual identity’ [with the experience o f satisfaction].
The secondary process, however, has abandoned this intention and taken on another in its
place —the establishment of a ‘thought identity’ [with that experience]” (Freud [1900]:
641).
In this explanation, the notion of “drive” is important.^ Freud defines “drive” as
the mental representative of somatic impulse, which strives to discharge the quantity of
excitation which it carries. According to Freud, the accumulation o f excitations brings
about unpleasure. Therefore, a drive strives to find its way of releasing its excitation;
“within the primary system, this excitation remains ‘fi-eely mobile’ — i.e. capable of infinite
displacement in its search for discharge” (Silverman 1983: 68). On the contrary, the
second process inhibits the dissipation of that excitation; “the second system can only
cathect an idea if it is in a position to inhibit any development of unpleasure that may
proceed fi'om it” (Freud [1900]: 640). Then, can the second system completely master the
first system? According to Freud, the answer is ‘no’:

^ . Freud’s term Trieb was translated as “instinct” by James Strachey, it is radically
different fi'om the common sense of instinct we have. Trieb refers to “an elemental
impulse or striving that is radically unspecified with respect to its aims and objects”
(Boothby 1991: 229). According Boothby, Freud distinguished the term Instinkt firom the
term Trieb\ “What distinguishes Trieb from animal instinct is the greater latitude and
openness to variation between the drive impulse and its mode and means of satisfaction”
(Boothby 1991: 30).
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...the primary processes are present in the mental apparatus from the first,
while it is only during the course of life that the secondary processes
unfold, and come to inhibit and overlay the primary ones; it may even be
that their complete domination is not attained until the prime o f life. In
consequence of the belated appearance o f the secondary processes, the
core of our being, consisting o f unconscious wishful impulses, remains
inaccessible to the understanding and inhibition o f the preconscious; the
part played by the latter is restricted once and for all to directing along the
most expedient paths the wishful impulses that arises from the unconscious
(Freud [1900]; 642).
Although Freud says that the possibility is great that the secondary processes completely
dominates the primary processes, the emphasis is put on the impossibility because the core
of our being consists of unconscious wishful impulses. Then, what are the unconscious
wishful impulses? According to Freud, the unconscious wishful impulses are not an innate
instinct of our being; they are constituted during our infantile life. Thus, the unconscious
wishful impulses have their history. Later, Freud explained the process o f their
constitution through the story o f the Oedipus complex.
In his early topography o f the human psyche, Freud demonstrates the human
psyche as a dynamic process between the primary process and the secondary process.
There is no unified, autonomous essence in the human psyche. In the first topography,
there is no place allotted to the ego. Freud just hints that the function o f the ego is an
inhibition or a resistance. In the earlier text of Project o f the Scientific Psychology, Freud
conceptualized the ego as a negative structure. According to this earlier notion, the ego is
“an essentially defensive, regulatory structure” (Boothby 1991: 53). In “On Narcissism:
An Introduction” (1914), Freud confirmed that the ego is not a pregiven entity and its
main function is negative. Freud argues, “it is impossible to suppose that a unity
comparable to the ego can exist in the individual from the start: the ego has to develop”
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(Freud [1914]; 34). The ego originates from the subject’s ability to take itself or part of
its own body as a love object, which is called the primary narcissism. When this ego is in
conflict with the subject’s cultural and ethical ideals, the ego shifts from the primary
narcissism (the real ego) to the secondary narcissism (the ideal ego). The ideal ego is an
effort to regain the primary narcissism where the subject thought itself all perfect. Thus
the ego’s fimction is to maintain its sense of perfection. It repressed all that contradict its
perfection. Freud says, “Repression...proceeds from the ego; we might say with greater
precision: from the self-respect of the ego” (Freud [1914]: 50).
But, in his later topography of human psyche Freud is said to suppose the unified
and autonomous agency, the ego. The so-called ego psychologists, who primarily
accepted Freud’s later works, see the ego as an apparatus of regulation and adaptation to
reality**. In The Ego and the Mechanisms o f Defence, Freud’s daughter, Anna, set the
tasks of ego psychology as follows: “From the beginning analysis, as a therapeutic
method, was concerned with the ego and its aberrations: the investigation of the id and of
its mode of operation was always only a means to an end. And the end was invariably the

“*. Grosz summarizes this view of the ego as follows: “ 1. the ego is a pregiven, natural, or
innate faculty, the biological result of the interaction of psychical and social relations with
the surfece of the organism; 2. the ego is one ‘agency’ or system among a number of
others which compete for gratification within the subject; 3. the ego is the ‘reasonable’
mediator intervening between antagonistic forces, arbitrating as an outsider between the
demands of the id and the requirements of reality; 4. the ego’s specific form is a
consequence of the neuronal impact of external impingements on the subject’s interiority.
It also acts as a delegate for the id’s wishes. It is the agency guarding and supervising the
pleasure-seeking id and a hostile, repressive reality; 5. the ego, as mediator or rational
harmoniser o f psychical conflict, is thus responsible for the ‘higher’ mental
accomplishments of culture; 6. the ego functions to inhibit psychical impulses and/or the
force of social custom. Its role is to modify both, inducing compromises between these
antagonistic interests by inhibiting their strength or impetus” (Grosz 1991: 26).
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same: the correction of these abnormalities and the restoration of the ego to its integrity”
(Anna Freud, quoted in Frosh 1987: 87). American ego-psychologists, especially Hartman
and Erikson, developed ego psychology by accepting Anna Freud’s account o f the ego.
According to this view, the ego is primarily a mediator between the demands of instinct
and reality. In The Ego and the Problem o f Adaptation, Heinze Hartmann equates the
function of the ego with adaptation to reality. The ego possesses a “conflict-free sphere, a
margin of independence from the clamoring of the id” (Boothby 1991: 35). In what
follows, I will contend that the ego psychologists’ interpretation of Freud should be
reinterpreted in regard to the whole contexts of Freud’s writings. In my view, the ego
disguises itself as the unified and autonomous agency, but it turns out to be a split agency;
internally, it includes the conscious and the unconscious, and externally, it is challenged by
the repressed unconscious.
In The Ego and the Id (1923), Freud demonstrates the psychical apparatus in
terms of intrasubjective relations among the superego, ego, and id. Because of the
quotation below, many interpreters of Freud have considered the superego as the locus of
repression, conscience, and reproach, the id as the locus of the repressed drives, and the
ego as the mediator between the superego and the id.
The functional importance o f the ego is manifested in the fact that normally
control over the approaches to motility develops upon it. Thus in its
relation to the id it is Uke a man on horse, who has to hold in check the
superior strength of the horse; with this difference, that the rider tries to do
so with his own strength while the ego uses borrowed forces. Often a
rider, if he is not to be parted from his horse, is obliged to guide it where it
wants to go; so in the same way the ego is in the habit of transforming the
id’s will into action as if it were its own (Freud [1923a]: 19).
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Many ego psychologists interpret the above quotation as evidence that the ego coincides
with the preconscious and conscious. I doubt this interpretation because in this article
Freud argues that parts o f the ego are unconscious. We have to listen carefully to
Freud’s own assertion. While Freud contends that the ego is “a coherent organization of
mental process” (Freud [1923a]; 8), he also holds that “a part o f the ego, too —and
Heaven knows how important a part —may be Ucs., undoubtedly is f/cs” (Freud [1923a]:
9). According to Freud, the unconscious is timeless: “We have learnt that unconscious
mental processes are in themselves ‘timeless’. This means in the first place that they are
not ordered temporally, that time does not change them in any way and that the idea of
time cannot be applied to them” (Freud [1920]: 31-32). If the ego includes together the
conscious and the unconscious, how can we say that the ego is the coherent organization
of mental process? How should we understand these contradicting statements?
First of aU, we have to follow Freud’s own explanation. According to Freud, each
individual is “a psychical id, unknown and unconscious, upon whose surface rests the ego,
developed from its nucleus the Pcpt. system” (Freud [1923a]: 17)

Pcs.

Repressed

Diagram 2.
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As we see in the diagram 2, the ego is not sharply separated from the id; its lower portion
merges into id. But the repressed is cut off sharply from the ego.
In this article, Freud says further, “We recognize that the Ucs. does not coincide
with repressed; it is still true that all that is repressed is Ucs.., but not all that is Ucs. is
repressed” (Freud [1923a]; 9). In other words, the unconscious consists of the
(repressed) unconscious and the (non-repressed) unconscious. The unconscious belonging
to the ego is the (non-repressed) unconscious. Freud holds that the antithesis between the
conscious and the unconscious is substituted for the antithesis between “the coherent ego”
and “the repressed” which is split off from it. Now, we have to examine the process of
genesis of the ego in order to understand the relationship between the ego and the
repressed. Because consciousness is the nucleus of the ego, we first have to examine the
genesis of the conscious.
In Beyond the Pleasure Principle ( 1920), Freud holds that consciousness arises
from perception and functions as the shield against the external stimuli: “What
consciousness yields consists essentially of perceptions of excitations coming from the
external world and o f feelings of pleasure which can arise from within the mental
apparatus; it is therefore possible to assign the system Pcpt-Cs.^ a position in space. It
must lie on the borderline between outside and inside; it must be turned towards the
external world and must envelop the other psychical systems” (Freud [1920]: 26). Unlike
Hegel, Freud does not see consciousness as an essential substance or pure negativity.
According to Freud, external stimuli give rise to excitations in perception and leave traces
which form the foundation of memory. While most traces sink into the system Ucs.
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through the system Pcpt-Cs., some traces become the sources of the origin of
consciousness. Consciousness has its genetic history because “consciousness arises
instead of a memory-trace” (Freud [1920]; 28).
Freud explains the function of consciousness as a shield against the external stimuli
by exemplifying the living vesicle with its perceptive cortical layer; “its outermost surface
ceases to have the structure proper to living matter, becomes to some degree inorganic
and thenceforward functions as a special envelop or membrane resistant to stimuli. In
consequence, the energies of the external world are able to pass into the next underlying
layers, which have remained living, with only a fragment of their original intensity; and
these layers can devote themselves, behind the protective shield, to the reception of the
amounts o f stimulus which have been allowed through it” (Freud [1920]: 30).
Consciousness is similar to the living vesicle’s perceptive layer. Consciousness is
constituted while it repeatedly receives external stimuli. The energies of external stimuli
pass through the conscious and are preserved in id. But the accumulation of these
energies generates the tension with the psyche, and these energies try to be discharged.
The ego is differentiated from the id in the process of blocking these energies. Thus, the
ego is the end-product o f a long evolution of the apparatus of adaptation. Genetically, the
conscious and the ego are constituted as the products of the gradual differentiation of the
id resulting from the influence o f external stimuli: “We were justified in dividing the ego
from the id, for there are certain considerations which necessitate that step. On the other
hand, the ego is identical with the id, and is merely a specially differentiated part of it... The
Ego is, indeed, the organized portion of the id” (Freud [1926]: 97). Freud calls ego-
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instincts death-instincts because the ego tries to maintain the static state of energies or to
keep excitations as low as possible. Therefore, the ego tries to control all psychic
processes. If we admit that control is possible only when the ego knows itself as well as
other psychical agents, we come to understand why the ego has a strong compulsion to
know everything*.
Therefore, the ego fancies itself as an agency of repression as well as resistance.
The ego tries to repress the energies which may generate unpleasure and resist the
endeavor of the repressed unconscious to become conscious. The ego can be an agent of
repression and resistance because I) the ego is not separated from the unconscious and 2)
therefore, the ego “knows” the contents of the unconscious®. If the ego does not know
the contents of the unconscious, how can it repress the unconscious wishes? But these
same facts stated above prevent the ego from being an autonomous and unified agency.
Anxiety is the clear evidence o f it. Until the 1920s, Freud held that anxiety is the
energy of repressed libido. Anxiety is an alternative mode of releasing the instinctual

*. It is now evident that the compulsion of the Hegel’s subject o f desire to consciously
know himself as well as others is the ego’s compulsion.
®. In the earlier article, “The Unconscious”, Freud already contended that the conscious
has the same contents as the unconscious, but the mode o f representation is different” “It
strikes us all at once that now we know what is the difference between a conscious and an
unconscious idea. The two are not, as we supposed, different records of the same content
sistuate in different parts of the mind, nor yet different fimctional atates of cathexis in the
same part; but the conscious idea comprises the concrete idea plus the verbal idea
corresponding to it, whilst the imconscious idea is that of the thing alone” (Freud [1915]:
133 - 134). The term “idea” is same as the tem “presentation”. In “The Ego and Id”,
Freud confirms this argumentation: “I have already, in another place (in “The
Unconscious”), suggested that the real difference between a Ucs. and a Pcs. idea
(thought) consists in this: that the former is carried out on some material which remains
unknown, whereas the latter (the Pcs.) is in addition brought into connection with wordpresentations” (Freud [[1923]: 12).
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energies denied expression by the secondary agencies of the psychic apparatus; “Refused
discharge along preferred pathways, energies subject to repression undergo a
transformation and are experienced in characteristic somatic reactions; shortness o f breath,
weakness, sweating, shaking, diiziness, etc.” (Boothby 1991: 140). According to this
view, without repression, there would not be anxiety. But this view failed to explain the
infentile anxiety which occurs before the establishment o f the superego as the agency of
repression and conscience. In other words, it cannot explain why the infant has anxiety
although there is no repression. After the 1920s, Freud argued that infantile anxiety stems
from the prematurity of birth. Although the ego has defensive functions against internal
and external threats, it cannot totally compensate for the lack of coordination of the body
conditioned by the prematurity o f birth. Anxiety, thus, is a signal of danger to the ego:
“the long period o f time during which the young of the human species is in a condition o f
helplessness and dependence... establishes the earliest situation of danger” (Freud [1926]:
154-155). This situation gives the infant the anxiety that its life is threatened: “Anxiety is
the reaction to danger” (Freud [1926]: 150). Freud argued that it is the integrity o f the
ego which is threatened in anxiety. Anxiety gives a clear evidence that the ego cannot be
an autonomous and unified agency: “The very possibility o f anxiety testifies to the fact that
the formation of the ego does not fully quell the infant’s internal chaos” (Boothby 1991:
143). Therefore, instead of thinking that the ego is a reasonable mediator between the
demand of the id and the demand o f reality, we had better think that the psyche is always
in the dynamic process of conflict. In fact, Freud’s final formulation of the ego and the id
recapitulated his separation o f primary and secondary processes set out in his earlier work
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Project o f the Scientific Psychology (Boothby 1991; 66).
So far, I have examined Freud’s metapsychology. Freud’s metapsychology is an
abstract map o f the human psyche and its mode of operation. Now, we have to study the
concrete and historical contents o f the human psyche in modem Western culture and its
mode o f operation. In other words, we have to examine the discourse which produces the
conscious, the imconscious, and the ego in modem Western culture, the Oedipus story.
2.

The Oedipus Complex: The Maker o f the Masculine Subject

In my opinion, the so-called Oedipus myth is a male story which explains the
mechanism of the constitution o f the male subject. During all of his academic life, Freud
continued to assert the universal validity of the Oedipus complex, but he never gave any
systematic account of it (Laplanche and Pontalis 1973: 283). Therefore, we have to
synthesize Freud’s accounts of the Oedipus complex scattered in his works.
Although Freud already recognized the importance of the Oedipus complex in
1897 when he wrote Project o f the Scientific Psychology, a more detailed account
appeared in The Interpretation o f Dreams {\90Q). In this article, Freud makes mention of
the Oedipus complex, but he does not yet establish it as a main mechanism o f constituting
the unconscious wishful impulses in modem Westem culture. After analyzing the wishes
o f dreams, Freud holds that dreaming is a piece of infantile life that has been superseded.
Freud says that the chief part in the mental lives o f all children who become
psychoneurotics is played by their parents. According to Freud, being in love with the one
parent and hating the other are among the essential constituents of the stock o f psychical
impulses which is formed at that time and which is o f such importance in determining the

R ep ro d u ced with p erm ission o f th e copyright ow ner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission.

49

symptoms of the later neuroses. This early experience is not confined only to
psychoneurotics, but it is a universal experience. Psychoneurotics are only distinguished
by exhibiting on a magnified scale feelings o f love and hatred toward their parents which
occur less obviously and less intensely in the minds of most children.
Therefore, the Oedipal desire, in which a child loves the opposite sex parent and
hates the same sex parent, constitutes most o f the unconscious wishful impulses. But
these unconscious wishful impulses contradict the (pre)conscious: “Among these wishful
impulses derived fi'om infancy, which can neither be destroyed nor inhibited, there are
some whose fulfillment would be a contradiction o f the purposive ideas of secondary
thinking. The fulfillment of these wishes would no longer generate an affect of pleasure
but of unpleasure; and it is precisely this transformation of affect which constitutes the
essence of what we term ‘repression’” (Freud [1900]: 643). This repression inhibits the
expression of the unconscious wishful impulses, but libidinal drive, which always strives to
release its excitements, accomplishes its expression in a disguised form called
representation.
In this article, Freud does not connect the Oedipus complex with the forming of
the masculine subject, but in The Ego and the Id (1923) he clearly holds that the Oedipus
complex makes the masculine subject as well as unconscious desire. During the Oedipal
stage, the ego plays a fundamental role in making the masculine subject through its
identificatory function.
It would be useful to examine Freud’s explanation o f the psycho-sexual
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development of boys. In the beginning, the male infant cannot distinguish himself from an
object, other. Originally, he was a part of his mother, and therefore, he cannot distinguish
himself from his mother. According to Freud, the male infant has an object-cathexis
(investment) for his mother (which is originally related to the mother’s breast and is the
prototype of object-choice on the anaclitic model’), and simultaneously has an
identification with his father (Freud calls it a primary identification). In the early period of
his life, his object-cathexis for his mother and his identification with his father do not
contradict each other because he cannot distinguish himself from other: “At the beginning,
in the individual’s primitive oral phase, object-cathexis and identification are no doubt
indistinguishable from each other” (Freud [1923a]: 23). Object-cathexis for his mother
and identification with his father co-exist peacefully until the boy’s sexual wishes in regard
to his mother become more intense and his father is perceived as an obstacle to the
fulfillment of those wishes. From this conflict, the Oedipus complex originates. The
peaceful dyadic relations between the male infant and his mother is threatened by the third
person, the father. When object-cathexis clashes with identification, the male infant is
forced to desert his object-cathexis for his mother. The male infant’s object-cathexis for
his mother should be “painfully” given up because of his fear o f castration. But he actually
does not give up his object-cathexis for his mother; he just displaces it into the

’ . In “On Narcissism: An Introduction” (1914), Freud classified the type of object-choice
as anaclitic type and narcissistic type. In an anaclitic (literally, leaning-up-against) type,
those persons who have to do with the feeding, caring, and protection o f the child (usually
mother) become his earliest sexual objects. On the contrary, in the narcissistic type the
children seek themselves as the first love-object. Freud claims that especially those people
whose libidinal development has suffered some disturbance, as in perverts and
homosexuals, have taken as their model not the mother but their own selves (Freud
[1914]: 44 -45).
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intensification o f his identification with his father. The formation o f the masculine subject,
thus, is a product of the intensification of his identification with his father. But this
identification cannot completely compensate the loss of the loved object, it is only a
substitute for the loss. The loss of the loved object necessitates the introjection of other
into the structure of the ego itself. Thus, the Oedipus complex structures the masculine
subject (intensification of his identification with the father) as well as the unconscious
desire of regaining the peaceful, dyadic relationship with his mother. The masculine
subject emerges at the cost of losing his object-cathexis for his mother. The stronger the
masculine subject is, the more intensive the unconscious desire is. The stronger the
masculine subject identifies with the father (the position imposed by the cultural), the more
he is challenged by the unconscious desire of regaining the lost dyadic relationship
between the male infant and his mother.

(C) Lacan: Phantasmatic Sense of Wholeness, Completeness and Fulfillment
Lacan’s account of subjectivity starts fi'om the assumption that the subject is split
into the ego and the unconscious (the speaking subject). To Lacan, while the ego is
intimately connected with the notion o f fiction, the unconscious is structured like
language. According to Lacan, the ego is a product of the “imaginaiy” or “primary”
identification with the image outside o f the subject. The speaking subject comes fi'om the
secondary identification with the position imposed by the Oedipal logic. The former is a
tragic fete o f the human subject, resulting fi'om the ontological want of being*: “There is

*. Some Leftists influenced by Lacan consider this aspect as the sad fete of the subject in
capitalist society, not the human condition in general (Turkle 1992: 79). But for Lacan it
is an ontological condition of human beings.
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something originally, inaugurally, profoundly wounded in the human relation to the world”
(Lacan [1955a]: 167). By contrast, the latter is a specific product of modem Westem
culture; the speaking subject in modem Westem culture is set up by the Oedipus Complex.
The ego is characterized by the imaginary unity, which is achieved at the cost of the
subject’s alienation fi'om itself. On the contrary, the speaking subject is characterized by
the endeavor to regain the peaceful, dyadic relation with the mother, the lost paradise,
through fantasy. I will call the ego and the speaking the masculine subjects; while the ego
strives for the world o f sameness in which the other’s difference should be negated to
become a component o f it, the speaking subject seeks to regain, in fantasy, the lost
imaginary unity in which the other is reduced to object a. Therefore, neither the ego nor
the speaking subject, according to Lacan, is a true subject.
1.

The Ego or Narcissistic moi

For Lacan, the primitive ego or the “specular F’ is a fictitious effect of imaginary
identification with its mirror image: “The fundamental fact which analysis reveals to us and
which I am in the process of teaching you, is that the ego is an imaginary function” (Lacan
[1954]: 193). In “The Mirror Stage as Formative of the Function of the F’ (1949), Lacan
introduces the famous notion o f the so-called mirror stage to psychoanalysis. In this
article, Lacan opposes the philosophy of consciousness: “It [mirror stage] is an experience
that leads us to oppose any philosophy directly issuing fi'om the Cogito” (Lacan [1949]:
1). The ego as a subject is a product of fictitious identification with an imago: “We have
only to understand the mirror stage as an identification"^ (Lacan [1949] : 2)
According to Lacan, the mirror stage, which occurs approximately between 6
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months and 18 months of life, is a formative event in the development of the subject when
the infant begins to recognize his image in a mirror. Lacan claims that the human infant is
characterized by it’s prematurity at birth and organic insufficiency. Unlike other animals,
human beings are not fiilly developed when they are bom and sensory motor abilities are
clumsy (Lacan [1949]: 4). The human body in the first months o f human life is in the state
of “a primal chaos o f wholly unsymbolized somatic excitations” (Boothby 1991: 58).
According to psychoanalytic observations on the human infant, the infant tries to
overcome these biological deficiencies by imaginarily identifying himself with his image
reflected in the mirror. The human infant does not experience his own unity until it sees
that unity in the Gestalt of his own image or in another human being. The imaginary is
“half-rooted in the natural” (Lacan quoted in Boothby 1991: 28), and therefore, the
imaginary identification with his mirror image can be said to be a scientific fact (Ver Eecke
1983: 115).
The monkey at the age of about six to eight months has a greater problem-solving
ability than the human baby, but it does not show that it can grasp the meaning of a mirror
image. When the monkey infant sees its image in the mirror, he tries to establish the
reality of the image by looking behind the mirror. Afl:er verifying that nothing
corresponds to the image, it soon loses interest in it. But the human infant “experiences in
play the relation between the movements assumed in the image and the reflected
environment, and between this virtual complex and the reality it reduplicates” (Lacan
[1949]: 1). This activity shows an “ontological structure of the human world” (Lacan
[1949]: 2).
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Not only does this imaginary identification enable the infant to conceive himself as
a unity, but it also results in a fundamental alienation: “The entire dialectic which I have
given you as an example under the name of the mirror stage is based on the relation
between, on the one hand, a certain level of tendencies which are experienced —let us say,
for the moment, at a certain point in life —as disconnected, discordant, in pieces —and
there’s always something of that that remains —and on the other hand, a unity with which
it is merged and paired. It is in this unity that the subject for the first time knows himself
as a unity, but as an alienated, virtual unity” (Lacan [1954b]: 50). The human infant as the
chaos of excitations or formless libidinal energies is channeled or narrowed into the
Gestalt reflected in the mirror. In other words, the imago draws a specific energy from
the infant, through which the infant fixes himself to the imago. The problem is that there
always remains something which has not been drawn by the imago, which is the possibility
of the Real. Anyway, this imaginary or primary identification gives the infant the
“specular F’ which will be later integrated into the “social F’.
The human infant between the age of six months and two and a half years shows
another characteristic, transivitism: “The child who strikes another says that he has been
struck; the child who sees another fall, cries” (Lacan [1948]: 19). This phenomena means
that the human infant carmot distinguish himself from others; he identifies with others.
This imaginary identification includes a peacefial dyadic relationship with the other,
especially his mother. Originally, the human infant was one with his mother, but he is now
detached from her. The imaginary identification with his mother denies this separation
from his mother.
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According to Lacan, the mirror image is a first organized form in which the
individual identifies himself, and therefore, this image organizes and constitutes the
subject’s vision of the world; “the mirror-image would seem to be the threshold of the
visible world” (Lacan [1949]: 3). In Lacan’s view, the ego is not a seat of agency but the
seat o f fixation and narcissistic attachment. Through this attachment, the subject has a
sense o f illusory unity, the ego, but the function of the ego is that of méconnaissance
(misrecognition); upon the illusionary self-image, the ego attempts to make sense of the
world around him (Fink 1995: 37).
Lacan’s proposition o f the mirror stage has a revolutionary implication for
traditional Westem philosophy. The philosophy of consciousness based on the function of
the ego is totally false: “But unfortunately that philosophy [the contemporary philosophy
of being and nothing —I added] grasps negativity only within the limits of self-sufficiency
o f consciousness, whicfi, as one of its premises, links to the méconnaissances that
constitute the ego, the illusion of autonomy to which it entrusts itself’ (Lacan [1949]: 6).
If we define the modem project as a will to a totality as does Lyotard, for Lacan, the
subject’s striving for the discourse of totality is paradoxically inevitable because the ego,
which is formed during the mirror stage, keeps striving for imaginary wholeness or unity
through a whole life®.

®. I am convinced, after reading Lacan, that this is a tragic fate of human beings. What
political meaning does such a notion of the human being have? Louis Althusser, who
integrates Lacan’s mirror stage into his theory of ideology, shows it well. According to
Althusser, ideology is the imaginary relation of individuals to their real conditions of
social existence: “All ideology represents in its imaginary distortion is not the existing
relations of production (and the other relations that derive fi'om them), but above all the
(imaginary) relationship of individuals to the relations o f production and the relations that
derive fi'om them. What is represented in ideology is therefore not the system of real
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The imaginary or primary identification can be said to be an ontological fact
characteristic of human beings. But this interpretation is just a half story which tells the
process of the formation of the ego. Lacan explains the other aspect o f this process by
using the schema L.
S: subject

(Es) S

^

-►........... other

a; autre (French), i.e., other.
a’: another autre. For example, mother.
A; big other, i.e., the Symbolic

(ego) a--=^--------------------------- A Other

So far, we have assumed that the human infant has a natural tendency to imaginary
identification with his image reflected in the mirror. But in the schema L, the imaginary
identification (the ego - the other) is “mediated” by the Other, especially the mOther
(mother as the Other), who insists to the infant that the image in the mirror is him: “Yes,
baby, that’s you.” Through repeatedly hearing that the image in the mirror is him, the
infant recognizes the image as himself. This recognition brings pleasure to the infant, and
he becomes fascinated by his image in a mirror: “Fascination is absolutely essential to the
phenomenon of the constitution o f the ego. The uncoordinated, incoherent diversity o f the
primitive fi’agmentation gains its unity in so far as it is fascinated” (Lacan [1954b]: 50).
Therefore, the child tries to control and play with this image, but actually he just
earns the imaginary, not the real, mastery of his body. This imaginary mastery of his body

relations which govern the existence of individuals, but the imaginary relation of these
individuals to the real relations in which they live” (Althusser 1971: 160). All human
subjects are destined to live in a prison of ideology. Then, how is change possible?
Althusser opposes the science, Marxism, to ideology, but this only reaffirms the
epistemological privilege of science as a specific form of representation over any
representation forms.
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includes a fundamental alienation; the child only sees his form as more or less total and
unified in an external image, in a virtual, alienated, ideal unity that cannot actually be
touched. It anticipates his biological mastery, but it also structures his further relationship
to reality, which is doomed to be alienating: “The mirror stage is a drama whose internal
thrust is precipitated from insufficiency to anticipation —and which manufactures for the
subject, caught up in the lure o f spatial identification, the succession of phantasies that
extends from a fragmented body-image to a form of its totality that I shall call orthopaedic
—and, lastly, to the assumption of the armour of an alienating identity, which will mark
with its rigid structure the subject’s entire mental development” (Lacan [1949]: 4).
What is important here is: before hearing that his parents told him, “Yes, baby,
that’s you”, he was not fascinated by his mirror image. The first way in which he sees the
object is “mediated” by (M)other. But as soon as the human infant recognizes the imago
mediated by (M)other as his own, he becomes “alienated” in/by language or symbolically
castrated^”. In other words, the human infant is “eclipsed” by the Other or the Symbolic
order, he becomes the speaking subject in a circuit of a signifying system. In this sense,
alienation is a fundamental condition of human subjectivity: “I identify myself in language,
but only by losing myself in it like an object” (Lacan [1953]: 86). As soon as the human

. In Lacanian paradigm, there would be double alienations: ontological and symbolic
alienations. Ontological alienation seems to come from the human being’s natural
tendency to imaginarily identifying with imago outside himself. This alientaion is
intimately connected with the biological deficiencies of human being: the prematurity at
birth and the uncoordination o f motor sense. The ego tries to cover these deficiencies by
virtue of imaginary identification. Symbolic alienation comes from ± e signifying system
itself: the speaking subject always slips under or behind the signifiers. The speaking
subject tries to regain the lost dyadic realtion with the mother, but he is doomed to fail.
Because “a signifier is that which represents the subject for another signifier” (Lacan
[I960]: 316).
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infant becomes eclipsed by the Symbolic, the subject becomes split into the ego and the
unconscious or the speaking subject.
2. The Unconscious: the Speaking Subject
For the human infant to become a speaking subject, the dyadic relation between
the human infant and the mother should be shattered. In modem Westem culture, this
shattering happens in the Oedipal triangulation and the agency of that shattering is the
Name-of-the-Father. The Oedipal stage marks the moment when the human infant
becomes eclipsed by language as well as when the unconscious is installed in the human
infant.
The schema L is useful to explain this process. An imaginary vector, o-o’, explains
the ego’s imaginary identification with the mother; the mother is taken as an object of the
imaginary identification. The chaos of somatic excitement o f the human infant is
channeled into the mother. At this moment, the Oedipal crisis begins; the third term (the
Name-of-the-Father or the representative o f the Symbolic), inhibits and shatters the dyadic
relation between the infant and the mother. In saying in terms of the schema L, the second
vector of 0-S, the symbolic axis, traverses, challenges, and smashes the imaginary vector
of o-o’. As a result, the human infant is forced to lose the mother. This loss is
compensated by the Name-of-the-Father, a representative o f language; language transform
what is physically absent into what is symbolically present. At last, the human infant is
ready to become the speaking subject.
For Lacan, to become the speaking subject means that the unconscious is installed
in the subject. Lacan claims that “the unconscious is structured in the most radical way
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like a language, that a material operates in it according to certain laws, which are the same
laws as those discovered in the study of actual languages, languages that are or were
actually spoken” (Lacan [1958b]; 234). This statement means that the relationship that
exists among unconscious elements also exists in any given language among the elements
that constitute it: “the unconscious is nothing but a ‘chain’ of signifying elements, such as
words, phonemes, and letters, which ‘unfolds’ in accordance with very precise rules over
which the ego or self has no control whatever” (Fink 1995: 9).
The statement “the unconscious is stmctured like a language” can be explained in
two ways: genetically and structurally. First, we have to study how the unconscious is
made or installed in the subject; according to Lacan, the unconscious is constituted during
the time the subject enters into the Symbolic. Second, we have to study what the
characteristic of language is.
In order genetically to understand this statement, we have to discuss the so-called
“fort-da” game, which tells us the process of the infant’s entrance into language as well as
the process of constitution of the unconscious. The so-called “fort-da” game is
demonstrated in Freud’s writing. Beyond the Pleasure Principle (1920).
[H]e [the little boy of one and a half] was greatly attached to his mother,
who had not only fed him herself but also looked after him without any
outside help. This good little boy, however, had an occasional disturbing
habit of taking any small objects he could get hold of and throwing them
away fi'om him into a comer, under the bed, and so on, so that himting for
his toys and picking them up was often quite a business. As he did this he
gave vent to a loud, long-drawn-out ‘o-o-o-o’, accompanied by an
expression o f interest and satisfaction. His mother and the writer of the
present account were agreed in thinking that this was not a mere
inteijection but represented the German word ‘fort’ [‘gone’]. I eventually
realized that it was a game and that the only use he made of any o f his toys
was to play ‘gone’ with them. One day I made an observation which
confirmed my view. The child had a wooden reel with a piece o f string tied
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round it. It never occurred to him to pull it along the floor behind him, for
instance, and play at its being a carriage. What he did was to hold the reel
by the string and very skillfully throw it over the edge of his curtained cot,
so that it disappeared into it, at the same time uttering his expressive ‘o-oo-o’. He then pulled the reel out o f the cot again by the string and hailed
its reappearance with a joyful ‘da’ [‘there’] (Freud [1920]; 13 - 14).
In this example, Freud tells us that the little boy plays this game in order to symbolize the
absence and presence o f the mother. Through the repetition of this game of presence and
absence, he sought to separate himself from the mother. This game represents a symbolic
mastery over the unpleasant fact of the mother’s absence; symbolization begins when the
child gets his first sense that something could be missing.
In “The Function and Field of Speech and Language in Psychology” (1953), which
is called the Rome Discourse, Lacan re-interprets this “fort-da” game with the linguistic
model. According to Lacan, this game shows us the structure of the unconscious. Lacan
reads this game as an allegory about the linguistic mastery of the drives; he associates this
mastery with a signifying transaction by means of which the unconscious is established.
By this game the child leams to control his feelings about the presence and absence o f the
loved object, the mother. What is important here is that this game shows us the
introduction of the language system into the child: “This is the point of insertion o f a
symbolic order that pre-exists the infantile subject and in accordance with which he will
have to structure himself’ (Sarup 1992: 183).
The infant as a chaos of somatic excitation has “need”, undifferentiated physical
appetite, which should be satisfied for him to survive. It was the mother who satisfied the
infant’s need, but the occasional absence o f the mother risks the infant’s survival.
Through the “fort-da” game, the infant leams to substitute his need in linguistic terms and
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to express it in language. Need is formulated in language, and becomes transformed into
“demand”. But demand is an alienated form o f need; the infant’s need is always beyond
his demand. At the price of this alienation, the infant maintains his dyadic relation with the
mother. In this sense, the infant is not yet the speaking subject. The “fort-da” game tells
us the moment that the infant enters into language. When the infant enters into language,
need is distorted in the linguistic form of need, demand. This distorted need is the
condition of the unconscious.
The stmctuation of the unconscious proceeds in the Oedipus triangulation where
desire plays the main role. From the gap between need and demand, desire emerges:
“Desire begins to take shape in the margin in which demand becomes separated from
need” (Lacan [I960]: 311). Before the infant enters into language, the infant was one
with the mother. Desire is one to regain this; the infant desires to be everything to the
mother. In other words, the infant desires to be the object of the mother’s desire. But this
desire is destined to be frustrated: “As a child tries to fathom its mOther’s desire...it is
forced to come to terms with the fact that it is not her sole interest (in most cases, at
least), not her be-all and end-all” (Fink 1995: 50). Why the infant desire cannot be
satisfied is that the infant as an alienated subject in language desires the mother as another
alienated subject in language. Thus, this infant’s desire to be the object of the mother’s
desire is superimposed on one to desire the mother’s desire; the infant comes to realize
that the mother desires something beyond him. In modem Westem culture, it is the
Name-of-the-Father or the Phallus.
The Name-of-the Father functions as the agency of shattering the dyadic relation
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between the infant and the mother. The infant’s desire to be everything to the mother is
denied by the Name-of-the-Father. As a result, the infant becomes the speaking subject
whose position is defined by the Name-of-the-Father.
The process by which the infant becomes the speaking subject is the same as the
one by which the unconscious is constituted. The most important reason the infant deserts
his first love-object, the mother, during the Oedipal stage, is that he realizes that his
mother desires the Phallus. The infant always wants to be the sole object of his mother’s
affection, but her desire is directed toward the Phallus. Therefore, there is a gap between
the infant’s desire and his mother’s desire. This gap results in the object a, which is the
remainder produced when the dyadic relationship (unity) with his mother breaks down.
While the ego strives to identify itself with the imago, the mother or, the nurturer, the
speaking subject or the unconscious desires the object a, which is a cause of desire, in
order to regain the dyadic relationship smashed by the Symbolic. But this regaining of the
unity with his mother can be achieved only in fantasy. Only in his relation to the object a,
the subject achieves “a phantasmatic sense of wholeness, completeness, fulfillment, and
well-being” (Fink 1995: 60). In this sense, the ego as well as the speaking subject are all
masculine subjects; the ego fixes itself to the imaginary unity and the speaking subject
strives to regain, in fantasy, the lost imaginary unity.
Then what is the characteristic of language for Lacan? In chapters 15 (“Odd or
Even? Beyond Intersubjectivity”, 1955b) and 16 (“The Purloined Letter”, 1955c) of
Seminar H, Lacan holds that the unconscious consists in chains of quasi-mathematical
inscriptions. While to Freud the unconscious mental processes are timeless and fi'eely
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mobile, to Lacan the unconscious has a syntax, a set o f rules or laws. In order to verify
that the unconscious has a syntax, Lacan exemplifies the game of “odd or even”: “You
know the game, you must still have some memories o f school. You put two or three
marbles in your hand, and you put out your closed fist to the opponent, saying —Odd or
even? I have, two marbles say, and if he says odd, he must hand one over to me, and so
on” (Lacan [1955b]: 179). This game seems to be as totally random as the game of
tossing a coin, but there is a series of relays with winning and losing.
Fink explains this games by exemplifying the game of tossing a coin, heads or tails
(Fink 1995: 16-19). He marks heads and tails as + and -, and groups them by two, and
makes three groupings as follows:
( 1)
4—I"

(2)
4“ -

-

(3)
- -

4"

After that, he groups the result of tosses by overlapping pairs as follows:
2
2
+ +

Heads/Tails Chains

He reorganizes this chains as follows:
+ + - - + - - - +
123

2 2 3 3 2

Heads/Tails Chain
Numeric Matrix Category
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From the chains above, we come to know that a category I set o f tosses (+ +)
cannot be immediately followed by a category 3 set (- -) because the second throw in a
category 1 (+ +) is necessarily a plus, whereas the first throw in a category 3 (- -) has to
be a minus: “We have thus already come up with a way o f grouping tosses (a “symbolic
matrix”) which prohibits certain combinations (viz., 1 followed by 3, and 3 followed by 1)
(Fink 1995: 18). This is the basis of Lacan’s model of language, which teaches us about
the symbolic order itself: “any machine [adding machine in cybernetics] can be reduced to
a series o f relays which are simply pluses and minuses. Everything in the symbolic order
can be represented with the aid of such a series” (Lacan [1955a] : 185). Like the chains of
this game, the unconscious as a language has a syntax which allows certain combinations
and prohibits others. In other words, the chain of signifiers consisting of the unconscious
remembers or keeps track of its previous components: “This keeping track of or counting
constitutes a type of memory: the past is recorded in the chain itself, determining what is
yet to come” (Fink 1995: 19).
Although someone overcomes a certain complex resulting fi'om the traumatic
event of childhood, for example the Oedipus complex, the complex has been recorded in
the unconscious, i.e., the chains of signifiers. These Oedipal wishes inhibited by the father
or the Name of the Father continues to try to be represented in the realm o f the conscious.
The ways in which they find to be represented follows the logic of language, metaphor and
metonymy.
In “The Agency o f the Letter in the Unconscious or Reason since Freud” (1957),
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Lacan inverts Saussure’s notion o f the arbitrariness of the sign by contending that the
signifier has primacy over the signified in the creation of meaning. While for Saussure the
sign is an arbitrary combination (or unity) of the signifier (acoustic image) and the
signified (concept), for Lacan the signifier and the signified are two distinct and separate
orders. As we see in the algorithm below, the signifier is over the signified and there is a
fimdamental separation, a bar, between them.

s

There is a fimdamental “cut” or bar between the signifier and the signified. In the
algorithm of S/s, for Saussure S refers to the signified and s refers to the signifier, but
inversely for Lacan, S refers to the signifier and s refers to the signified. Lacan contends
that the two realms o f signifier and signified are never unified and the signifier S is
superior to the signified s because s is the secondary and passive effect of S. The final,
fixed meaning is impossible because of “an incessant sliding o f the signified under the
signifier” (Lacan [1957]; 154). The bar separating the signifier firom the signified “resists
signification” and “creates a real border...between the floating signifier and flowing
signified” (Lacan in Borch-Jacobson 1991; 178). Borch-Jacbson argues, “every signifier
becomes a ‘floating’ one (that is, as Lévi-Strauss said of the singular ‘zero symbol’,
‘empty o f meaning’), and, like Noah’s ark, it sails the floodwaters of the signified, without
clinging to them" (Borch-Jacobson 1991: 178). Therefore, the statement that the signified
is below the signifier does not mean that there is some opaque signified hidden behind
signifiers, a deep structure. But there are also “anchoring points” {points de capiton),
certain nodal points which stop the shding signifiers and fix their meaning. This notion of
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points de capiton denies Saussure’s notion of linearity of sign: “Ail our experience runs
counter to this linearity, which made me speak once... of something more like ‘anchoring
points’ {fioints de capiton") as a schema for taking into account the dominance of the
letter in the dramatic transformation that dialogue can effect in the subject” (Lacan [1957]:
154). There are some anchoring points to cross the bar of the Saussurian algorithm:
metaphor.
After inverting the Saussurian model, Lacan analyzes Freud’s The Interpretation o f
Dreams in order to verify that the unconscious is structured like a language. In this book,
Freud contends that condensation and displacement are a distorted mechanism through
which dream-thoughts are represented in the area o f consciousness. Put another way, the
unconscious wish can appear in the area of consciousness through the mechanism of
condensation and displacement. Lacan changes condensation and displacement into
linguistic terms:
Verdichtung, or ‘condensation’, is the structure of the superimposition of
the signifiers, which metaphor takes as its field, and whose name,
condensing in itself the word Dichtung, shows how the mechanism is
connatural with poetry to the point that it envelops the traditional function
proper to poetry. In the case of Verschiebung, ‘displacement’, the German
term is closer to the idea o f that veering off of signification that we see in
metonymy, and which fi'om its first appearance in Freud is represented as
the most appropriate means used by the unconscious to foil censorship
(Lacan [1957]: 160).
As we saw above, Lacan conceptualizes that condensation and displacement appearing as
the primary process in dreams operates according the linguistic law of metaphor and
metonymy. Lacan identifies metaphor with “one word for another” of paradigmatic
selection, which is expressed as follows (Lacan [1957]).
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/ |- ') s = 5(+)s
In this algorithm,/refers to function. S' to the signifier, s to the signified, s to congruency
(more or less), (+) to “the crossing of the bar —and the constitutive value of this crossing
for the emergence of signification” (Lacan [1957]; 164). Metaphor is adding (+)
something extra crossing the bar between the signifier and the signified, in other words,
the bar which separates them is momentarily re-established. Lacan, therefore, calls this
forging of meaning “anchoring points.” This metaphor produces the effect of
signification, which is proper to the poetic language. But due to the invasion of the
metonymic chain caused by other signifiers, this meaning soon evaporates. Lacan
identifies metonymy with “word-to-word connexion” o f syntagmatic combination, which
is expressed as follows (Lacan [1957]).
f{S...S')S = S{-)s
In this algorithm, the left-hand side refers to a functional representation of the relation
between two contiguous signifiers (6"...^), namely that one signifier is displaced by
another signifier according to their contiguity. The left-hand side 5(—)5 represents that
the bar between the signifier and the signified remains, which prevents the signifier fi"om
corresponding to its elusive signified. In other words, it refers the relation between
signifiers and a signified which does not transverse the barrier of censorship. This
metonymy is the “empty intentionality” which anticipates its meaning in the process of
unfolding its signifier’s dimension before it (Borch-Jacobson 1991: 181-182).
Metaphor functions on the paradigm (the vertical set of signifiers substitutable for
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each other), choosing signifiers according the similarity between words, not objects. By
contrast, metonymy functions on the syntagm (± e horizontal set of signifiers brought
together), combinating signifiers selected according to the contiguity between words, not
objects. Like this, Lacan equates Saussure’s paradigm and syntagm with metaphor and
metonymy, and he articulates that they operate on the principles of similarity and
contiguity.
What is important here is that Lacan connects metaphor with the formation o f the
subject and metonymy with the subject’s relation to objects. The human subject can
become a subject only as far as he takes something else than himself, namely an other
signifier, as his own signified: “When he says ‘signified’ Lacan thinks ‘subject.’ Lacan’s
whole theory of metaphor is a theory o f the metaphor of the subject...', this subject can
grasp himself only through metaphor —that is to say, by missing himself — precisely
because he is signified by a signifier” (Lyotard in Borch-Jacobson 1991: 187). In other
words, the infant before becoming the subject, who was one with the mother, realizes for
the first time that the mother’s desire is the desire for the phallus after the signifier o f the
Name-of-the-Father is imposed. At this moment, the signifier of the Name-of-the-Father
displaces the mother’s lack, which is the role of metaphor. The infant becomes a speaking
subject only when he relates himself with this metaphoric signifier. This speaking subject
desires the other to desire himself, but the other always desires other than himself.
Therefore, there is a gap between them or their desires, from which the object a
originates. The object a functions to remind the subject of the lost oneness between the
infant and the mother. The object a is something fantasized that the other would have.
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and by cleaving to it, the subject can sustain the illusion of wholeness. But this illusion
soon breaks down; the object a is a substitute reminding of the lost oneness, a metaphor,
but a real object. Therefore, the endless displacement from a object a to another object a,
a metonymy, occurs.
3.

The Subject of the Real

Then, is the human being only the fictitious ego or the speaking subject alienated
in/by way of language? Is that all? Can’t we avoid the masculine subject? Most
poststructuralists interpret Lacan with their own terms and conceptualize the subject as
the holder o f the subject-position. But Lacan’s notion of the subject is beyond it".
Lacan’s psychoanalysis may seem to appear as if advocating pessimistic views about
human beings, but it also presents possibilities of change which arise primarily from the
notion of the Real.
Lacan’s notion of the Real is the most difiBcult concept to grasp among his three
orders, i.e., the Imaginary, the Symbolic, and the Real. Jacques-Alain Miller, son-in-law
of Lacan, periodized Lacan’s academic life into three phases: 1) 1950s through early
1960s, 2) 1964 through 1974, and 3) 1974 through 1981. The emphasis on the notion of
the Real differs depending on these three phases. The notion o f the Real during the first
phase is conceptualized as “concrete and already full, a brute pre-symbolic reality which
returns to the same place in the form o f need, such as hunger” (Ragland-SuUivan 1996:

" . For a view to distinguish Lacan from poststructuralists, see Ztzek (1989). According
to Zizek’s interpretation of Lacan’s theory of language, there is no language without
object. For poststructuralists, language is the self-referential movement of the signifier in
a closed circle. By contrast, for Lacan there is an objective, nonsignifying reference to this
movement, the object a.
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192). The object of the hunger, such as mother’s breast or mother, as the notion of the
Real is the object of the Real as well as the object of the Imaginary. This object is the
absolute density, and therefore, does not exist as such in the visible empirical form. When
the first object of drive pursues to satisfy hunger, the Real first manifests itself as the place
of the hole constituted in the full space called being. The being was full o f jouissance,
which the object of the Real pursued. But the pursuit is destined to fail. Due to the fact
that the experience of jouissance in the being can be thought to have existed after the fact,
it did not in fact exist in the past. Thus, it only exists in fantasy or in dreams (Fink 1995:
94). This is the reason why Lacan called this the object of the Imaginary. The object of
the Real pursues the impossible jouissance of Oneness. This pursuit is possible because of
the object a, which is the remainder/reminder of the Real that caused the desire of the
subject. Thus, the object a is the remainder of the Real as well as the imaginary object
which always reminds the Real. The speaking subject obtains a fantasy o f being full, not
divided but unified, through object a.
The second phase of the Real is described by Lacan as “the traumatic material of
unassimilated memories and meanings that blocks the dialectical movement of
symbolization, blocks the route to exchanging one’s savoir with another person”
(Ragland-Sullivan 1996: 197). The real resides at the points of impasse in language
exchange, functioning to make signification possible. The real does not exist outside the
signification, and thus, is not c&js D ing as the phenomenological sense which can never be
reached. The real is the precondition that makes the chain of signification possible as a
function of the link of the chain. The ontological identity cannot be achieved; the real
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always returns as a subversive force and reminds of trauma in language. En other words,
the trace of the real in language, or the symbolized real, returns as a subversive force in
signification.
During the third phase, the concept of the real is developed while differences
between the two sexes are explained. The male possesses the fantasy of completeness and
wholeness through the phallus despite the fact that there does not exist an adequate
signifier to represent the difference between the two sexes. However, the female cannot
possess the same fantasy as the male does, because the female can be partially determined
by the phallus, but not as a whole. The father’s constraints against sexual desire for the
mother functions for a man as a limit to his range o f motion and pleasures, whereas the
female can go beyond that boundary set by the father’s constraints due to the fact that the
female possesses a signifier unique to her.
This concept of the real is ambivalent. All human subjects want to have a
relationship with the real; there was a jouissance in which the absence of the being was
filled in such a relationship. Therefore, the human subject, especially the male subject,
continues to seek oneness in fantasy. This original desire to have a relationship with the
real manifests itself in a distorted seeking of oneness in fantasy by the human subject'”.
On the other hand, the subject can encounter the real while seeking oneness in fantasy.
According to Lacan, the real is primarily related to the mother’s body. The mother’s body
is the space of the real before becoming symbolized as well as the matrix to make

. The aim of Lacanian psychoanalysis is to introduce a further gap between the
speaking subject and the object a, thus disturbing the fantasized sense of completeness,
fiilfillness, and wholeness (Fink 1995: 67).
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signification possible. Temporally, Lacan’s real is associated with the relationship
between child and mother prior to the mirror stage, in which only fullness of being without
either alienation or gaps exists. For this reason, feminists concentrated their work on the
pre-Oedipal stage.

Summary and Implication
Hegel’s subject o f desire functions in the same way as the ego (of Freud and
Lacan’s); its most important function is identification. The world in which this subject
lives is the dyadic world of opposition, namely, identity and difference. Using a Lacanian
term, this is the imaginary world where only love or hate exists. Hegel’s subject o f desire
tries to reduce the other to self-othering and Freud and Lacan’s ego seeks to identify itself
with the other reflected in itself. Both o f them disguise themselves as autonomous
agencies. Just as Hegel’s subject of desire negates other’s difference in order to achieve
its self-certainty, the ego represses the other (the unconscious) in order to secure its
coherent “sense of self.” Both self-certainty o f Hegel’s subject of desire and coherent
sense of self are other names for “identity” which modem Western politics have tried to
achieve. The “politics o f identity” defines the other as a matter which should be negated
and assimilated t o ‘T ’, not as an absolute difference'^. Therefore, the world of the ego is
one of sameness where the other is reduced to self-othering.

. The term “politics o f identity” does not directly related to the identity politics which
prevailed in 1960s in the U.S. The politics of identity refers to the either/or logic that
essentializes and substantializes individual/group natures.
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There is another subject: Hegel’s subject of recognition, Freud’s masculine subject
or Lacan’s speaking subject. This subject recognizes that the other is a condition of his
existence. Therefore, he desires that the other desires him. He also desires the other’s
desire. He wants mutual recognition, but he is destined to fail because he is the alienated
subject in language as a signifying system'"*. To Lacan, the speaking subject follows the
same rule as language, which belongs to the Symbolic because it is structured like
language. The speaking subject strives to achieve a phantasmatic sense of wholeness.
According to Lacanian psychoanalytic discourse, there is a true subject. It is
similar to Freud’s subject of the unconscious who manifests itself in daily life as a breach,
an interruption in discourse and immediately disappears. It is not a subject of “presence”,
unlike the Cartesian subject who is every time he says to himself, “I am thinking.” This is
the subject of the real which is a matrix of signification as well as residing at the points of
impasse in language exchange. The subject o f the real is primarily associated with a
woman. Thus, we now have to inquire into the feminine subject produced by modem
Westem discourse.

. Freud’s masculine subject is also a castrated subject by the father or the father’s “No.
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CHAPTERS

DISCOURSE ON THE FEMININE SUBJECT

In modem Western discourse, the female is not a subject; the female is defined as
an object, especially a sexual object of the male. The psychoanalytic discourse of Freud
and Lacan also produces the male as a subject, and the female as a sexual object.
Therefore, to the female, the problem of subjectivity is the same as one of sexual identity.
I believe that there have been two general sexual identities, male sexual identity and female
sexual identity subjugated to male sexual identity, in psychoanalytic discourse which, I
consider to be a model of modem Westem “discourse” (not necessarily in the historical
real world), which denied and oppressed the existence of so-called abnormal sexual
identities. We could just criticize that Freud and Lacan theorized the developmental
psychology of man in general and woman in general, but we could read their texts
“symptomatically” ', and project the formation of a new discourse on the female subject
different fi’om the modem, Westem discourse.

' . The “symptomatic reading” was first used by Freud , who read dreams symptomatically
in The Interpretation o f Dreams. In social theory, Louis Althusser re-read Marx’s Capital
with the method o f symptomatic reading. Althusser says, “Only since Freud have we
begun to suspect what listening, and hence what speaking (and keeping silent), means
{veut dire)-, that this ‘meaning’ {vouloir dire) of speaking and listening reveals beneath the
innocence of speech and hearing the culpable depth of a second, quite different discourse,
the discourse of the unconscious” (Althusser and Balibar 1979; 16). Therefore, the
74
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I do not think that Freud and Lacan assume an essential substance o f “female
sexual identity”, but instead assume the historical category of it. This category is not an
abstract and conceptual one, nor the “ideal type” o f Weber. The category o f “female
sexual identity” has its context in the temporality (modem) and the locality (Westem), and
therefore, it is a concrete and historical category which came into existence by the
modem, Westem discourse. Freud characterized modem Westem culture as
ocularcentrism and phallocentrism, and discovered that this was constituted by the male
discourse, the Oedipus story^. Lacan re-wrote ocularcentrism and phallocentrism with the
aids of structural linguistics and articulated the Oedipal logic as a specific logic o f modem
Westem culture^. In what follows, I will demonstrate that this general category of female
sexual identity was a product of ocularcentric and phallocentric discourse in Westem
societies. Therefore, it is not an essential substance, but it is produced as a “reality” by
modem Westem ocularcentric and phallocentric discourse.

“symptomatic reading” is a method of reading the absence of (unconscious) problems and
conceptions scattered in the problematic. According to Althusser, symptomatic reading is
not a method to read the hidden truth behind objects as hermeneutics, but produces a new
discourse. In other words, it is re-writing the existing texts.
^ . The term “ocularcentrism” is borrowed from Martin Jay (1994). It can be said that
modem Westem culture is dominated by vision.
^ . Interestingly, Luce Irigaray proposes an interpretation o f Freud and Lacan similar to
mine; “It is not a matter o f naively accusing Freud, as if he were a ‘bastard’. Freud’s
discourse represents the symptom of a particular social and cultural economy, which has
been maintained in the West at least since the Greek...What Freud demonstrates is quite
usefiil. When he argues —for example, and according to a still organistic argument —that
women’s sex is a ‘lack’, that castration for her amounts to her perceiving that she has no
sex, he describes rigorously the consequence o f our socio-cultural system. Lacan, using a
linguistic schema, concludes likewise, and repeats the same process when he writes that
woman is a lack in the discourse, that she cannot articulate herself...In some sense, this is
not false (Irigaray 1977; 63 - 64).
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According to psychoanalysis, female sexual identity is “consciously” achieved
through the female’s identification with sexual “position” imposed by the cultural. Identity
belongs to the conscious. Then, is this female sexual identity stable in ocularcentric and
phallocentric culture? In Freud’s writings, there are a lot of women patients who suffer
fi-om neuroses, especially hysteria. T h ^ challenge the modem Westem ocularcentric and
phallocentric culture"*. The Oedipus story has negated and repressed the female sexual
drives which were in flux in the pre-Oedipal stage, but they were not completely absorbed
in the female sexual identity imposed by modem Western culture. Therefore, Freud
produced new questions on female sexual identity; what are the characteristics of the preOedipal stage; Does the female body have ontological differences from the male body?
Lacan assigned an ontological privilege to vision by proposing the mirror stage which
belongs to the pre-Oedipal stage. He also assumed a jouissance of the female which
cannot be articulated under the ocularcentric and phallocentric culture.
Psychoanalytic feminists such as Luce Irigaray and Julia BCristeva have tried to re
write the Oedipus story by “symptomatically” reading the absence scattered in this
Oedipus story. Irigaray, who was influenced by Derrida’s deconstructionism, added
logocentrism to ocularcentrism and phallocentrism and argued that the ontological
difference of femininity could be a basis for escaping phallogocularcentrism^. BCristeva
also rewrites the Oedipus story by denying the privilege of sight in the pre-Oedipal stage.

“*. Especially Dora, Freud’s woman patient, is a good example of challenging the modem.
Western, phallocentric culture. Freud confessed that this case history was the subtlest
thing he had up to that point. See Freud [1905a].
* . The term “phallogocularcentrism” is also borrowed from Martin Jay, which means
phallocentrism + logocentrism + ocularcentism.
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Her notion of chora precedes specularization and is analogous to vocal or kinetic rhythm.
Unlike Irigaray, both sexes can be the subject who disrupt the symbolic governed by the
Law of the Father, they can try to change the thetic by activating the semiotic chora.

(A) Masculine Discourse on Female Sexual Identity
1. Freud: The Production o f New Questions on Female Sexual Identity
Many feminists have blamed Freud for his biological determination o f femininity,
but I have a different opinion. By failing to explain the so-called riddle o f femininity,
Freud discovered the constitutive logic o f modem Western culture and he analyzed it
within the modem, Westem culture. Therefore, Freud did not realize that he discovered
the constitutive principles of modem, Westem culture, and rather “unwittingly” produced
new questions. Until he died, Freud suffered from the problem of the so-called riddle of
femininity and tried to solve it. In later days, Freud felt that he solved the riddle of
femininity. I also agree with his assertion of having solved it, but only within the
phallocentric culture of modem Westem society. That is his achievement as well as his
limitation. In what follows, I will try to prove my assertion that Freud produced new
questions regarding femininity.
(1)

Analogous Theory

Freud seemed not to be interested in female sexuality until almost the 1930s,
although most o f his patients were women. But he was basically a scientist who kept
revising his theories according to his observation of his patients. To Freud, female
sexuality was not a unique phenomena different from the male one. In his early writing.
Three Essays on the Theory o f Sexuality (1905), Freud argues that both sexes have sexual
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monism until puberty. Freud denies the assumption that infants do not have sexuality:
“One feature of the popular view of the sexual instincts is that it is absent in childhood and
only awakens in the period of life described as puberty. This, however, is not merely a
simple error but one that has had grave consequences, for it is mainly to this idea that we
owe our present ignorance o f the fundamental conditions of sexual life” (Freud [1905b]:
39). While adult sexuality is genital, child sexuality is phallic and is characterized in the
oral, sadistic-anal, and phallic stages. Although Freud stresses the castration complex, he
does not introduce the Oedipus complex until this time®. Regardless of sex, there are
common characteristics of infant sexuality. Both male and female children think that
women as well as men originally had a penis, but that the former lost it by castration
(Freud [1905b]: 61). According to Freud, the differences in sexuality between the male
and the female do not appear until puberty.
Until 1923, Freud did not largely change his theory. In The Ego and the Id
(1923), Freud argues that the psycho-sexual development of girls is precisely “analogous”
to the psycho-sexual development of boys. Let me describe Freud’s explanation of the
psycho-sexual development of boys. At a very early age, the little boy develops an objectcathexis (investment) for his mother, which is originally related to the mother’s breast and
is the prototype of object-choice on the anaclitic model. By contrast, his father is an
object o f identification. Object-cathexis for his mother and identification with his father

®. In feet, Freud did discuss the Oedipus complex in his early writing. The Interpretation
o f Dreams (1900), but he did not hold with firm confidence the importance o f the Oedipus
complex until this time. But fi-om the early writings, Freud keeps emphasizing the
importance of the castration complex. While the castration complex for a boy means an
anxiety concerning his penis, for a girl it means an envy of the penis.
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co-exist peacefully until the boy’s sexual wishes in regard to his mother become more
intense and his father is perceived as an obstacle to the fulfillment o f those wishes. From
this conflict, the Oedipus complex originates. According to Freud, although there are
two possibilities, an identification with his mother and an intensification of his
identification with his father, in normal cases, the little boy’s object-cathexis for his mother
is given up because o f his fear o f castration. This way o f dissolving the Oedipus complex
permits the affectionate relationship with the mother, “/n a precisely analogous way, the
outcome o f the Oedipus attitude in a little girl may be an intensification of her
identification with her mother (or the setting up of such an identification for the first time)
—a result which will fix the child’s feminine character” (Freud [1923a]: 27 - 28, my
italics). Freud supposes that the earliest object-cathexis struggles with identification, for
there are always object-cathexis for mother “before” identification with father. While the
little girl maintains her identification with her mother, she has to detach herself fi-om the
first love-object, her mother, in other words, she has to change her love-object. Freud
does not explain why the little girl has to detach herself fi"om her mother; that is naturally
supposed.
Freud claims that in both sexes the relative strength of the masculine and feminine
sexual dispositions is what determines whether the outcome of the Oedipus situation shall
be an identification with the father or with the mother. He supposes that both infants are
originally bisexual. Until before this article, Freud just demonstrates that maleness
signifies activity and femaleness signifies passivity, but in this article he explains that the
difference between maleness and femaleness results fi-om the way the Oedipus complex is
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resolved. The identification with the father results in the formation of the super-ego. The
super-ego consists o f prohibition as well as precept (Freud [1923a]; 30). Only boys
achieve identification with their fathers, and therefore, only boys have a strong super-ego.
“The super-ego retains the character of the father, while the more powerful the Oedipus
complex was and the more rapidly it succumbed to repression (under the influence of
authority, religious teaching, schooling, and reading), the stricter will be the domination of
the super-ego over the ego later on —in the form o f conscience or perhaps of unconscious
sense of guilt” (Freud [1923a]; 30). In this paper, although Freud deals with only the case
of the little boy and does not say anything about the case of the little girl, we come to
know that Freud implies that the little girl, who identifies with her mother, cannot have a
strong super-ego.
In “The Infantile Genital Organization o f the Libido” (1923), he also confines his
object of study to boys. In this paper, Freud discusses the sexuality of little girls only in
regard to the sexuality of little boys. He says that as far as the girl is concerned,
sexualities are little known. Also, he holds that the little boy begins to despise women as
soon as he realizes that women do not have a penis. Freud confirms the male values of
society by saying that maleness signifies subject, activity, and possession o f the penis while
femaleness signifies object and passivity, but he does not explain why this phenomena
appears.
In “The Dissolution of the Oedipus Complex” (1924), Freud still emphasizes the
significance o f the castration complex. The dissolution of the Oedipal conflict in little
boys is instigated by the castration complex. The little boy has the internal tendency of
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masturbating (narcissistic interest in his penis), but this is inhibited by his mother, who
threatens that if the little boy keeps masturbating, he would lose his penis. But this threat
is not realized by the little boy until he “sees” female genitals. The little boy comes to
remember his early experience o f losing his mother’s breast, which was considered as a
part of his own body. The little girl also has a castration complex. The castration
complex of the little girl is instigated by her “seeing” the male’s penis. The little girl feels
her clitoris inferior and compensates her deficiency with penis-envy. Instead of giving up
her Oedipal desire for her mother (like the boy), the little girl turns away to her father in
order to substitute for the penis. Therefore, the desire to have a child is the dynamic
fector in the female Oedipus complex. But this desire for the penis is never accomplished;
for the little girl, the Oedipus complex did not abruptly end. According to Freud, the little
girl does not fear castration because she is already castrated. The absence of the fear of
castration results in the weakness of the super-ego. In the boy, the castration complex
results in the introjection o f paternal or parental authority, but the little girl does not
introject it because she lacks the castration complex.
In “Some Psychological Consequences of the Anatomical Distinction Between the
Sexes”(1925), Freud begins to question his theory of sexuality. Freud realizes that his
earlier explanation of the psycho-sexual development of children was too simple, and now
emphasizes the prehistory of the Oedipus complex, or the pre-Oedipal stage. Freud
admits that the pre-Oedipal situation of the little boy is not well known, let alone one of
the little girl. In the pre-Oedipal stage, both sexes are strongly attached to their mother.
Boys have to detach themselves fi-om their mother due to fear o f castration. But why
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should the little girl, who does not fear castration, detach herself from her mother? Freud
negatively sees the little girl’s attachment to her mother in the pre-Oedipal stage because
he believes that the little girl’s strong attachment to her mother is an obstacle in achieving
normal heterosexuality. According to Freud, the little girl detaches herself from her
mother because of her penis envy; her penis envy will be changed into the wish for a baby
(substitute of a penis). To Freud, penis-envy is an almighty key to opening the riddle of
femininity. According to Freud, because o f so-called penis envy, the little girl gives up her
clitoris’ masturbation, changes her love-object from the mother to the father and switches
her genital organ from clitoris to vagina. We see here why so many feminists have called
Freud a biological reductionist.
(2) Diverse Theory
In his 1931 article, “Female Sexuality”, Freud realizes that, for women, the preOedipal phase is more important than for men. He recognizes that the first love-object for
a woman is also her mother, and asks; why does a little girl find her way to her father?
How, when, and why does she detach herself from her mother? Freud supposes some
tasks must be completed for the little girl to achieve heterosexuality, which is normal
female sexuality for Freud. Firstly, a girl has to give up her clitoris as a sexual organ and
transfer to a new genital zone, the vagina (change of organ). Secondly, she has to change
her original mother-object from her mother to her father (change of love-object). For
Freud, only those who performed these tasks have real female sexuality; he thinks that the
vagina is the true feminine organ and only heterosexuality is normal. Freud tries to explain
these “real” tasks, but he seemed to fail, as I will show it in what follows. In fact, we do
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not have to suppose these tasks for women. In my opinion, these tasks were compulsory
demands for women, which were specific to modem. Western, phallocentric culture.
Freud claims that bisexual disposition in human beings is much stronger in women
than in men; women have both the clitoris (penis equivalent) and the vagina (the true
female organ), while men have only the penis. According to Freud, women have two
stages of sexuality; the masculine stage o f the clitoris and the female stage o f the vagina.
Freud recognizes that he has ignored that the clitoris as a masculine genital keeps
influencing female sexuality even after the “successful” passing from the clitoris to the
vagina. Also, Freud introduces new questions about the change of love-object; how does
this transformation take place? How radical or how incomplete is it? In previous
explanations, Freud does not doubt that the little girl feels inferior when she sees a penis,
but in this paper he recognizes that there are many other possibilities; 1) she can turn her
back on sexuality altogether; 2) she can cling in obstinate self-assertion to her threatened
masculinity, which may result in a homosexual object-choice; 3) she can achieve an
‘ultimate normal’ feminine attitude in which she takes her father as love-object.
Although there are three lines of development, Freud devalues the first and the
second lines. According to Freud, there is a fundamental difference of development
between men and women; in women, the castration complex does not destroy but rather
creates the Oedipus complex. “We should probably not err in saying that it is this
difference in the inner relation o f the Oedipus and castration-complexes which gives its
special stamp to the character o f women as a member of society” (Freud [1931]; 189). At
this point, Freud seems to be embarrassed because the castration complex cannot explain
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why the little girl has to turn away from her mother to her father. According to Freud,
women do not feel fear of castration because they are already castrated. Then, where is
the necessity o f changing the love-object? This was Freud’s problem. He was not able to
consider that there was no necessity because his problematic consisted of a range of
questions which already presupposed the necessity.
Instead of giving up his assumptions about female sexuality, Freud kept trying to
explain why the little girl turns away from her mother. He enumerates many reasons; 1)
the little girl is jealous o f those whom the mother loves; 2) this relationship between the
little girl and her mother has no real aim and therefore cannot be satisfied; 3) her mother
forbids masturbation; 4) when the little girl feels the castration complex, she also despises
the castrated mother and femininity in general; 5) the little girl blames her mother for not
having given her a penis. But Freud says that the relationship between the little girl and
her mother is ambivalent, and emphasizes that the female Oedipus complex is not the
homologue of the male Oedipus complex, and the pre-Oedipal attachment to the mother
plays an important part in the girl’s development.
In “Femininity” (1932), Freud’s arguments clearly show logical contradiction. He
gradually realizes that a person, anatomically, is neither totally male nor female. He
confesses, “All the while I am preparing to talk to you I am struggling with an internal
difficidty” (Freud [1932]; 139). He recognizes that it is inadequate to equate masculinity
with activity and femininity with passivity; “Even in the sphere o f human sexual life you
soon see how inadequate it is to make masculine behavior coincide with activity and
feminine with passivity” (Freud [1932]; 143). From the biological perspective, femininity
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is not characterized by passivity. Rather, the passivity o f femininity is constructed by the
influence of customs. Therefore, Freud wants to explain the social constitution of
femininity; “psycho-analysis does not try to describe what a woman is...but sets about
inquiring how she comes into being, how a woman develops out of a child with a bisexual
disposition” (Freud [1932]; 144).
According to Freud, normal women have to develop out of a bisexual disposition
to heterosexuality in which only the vagina is considered as a true sexual organ of women.
Although he promises to explain such a development socially, he again uses the biological
explanation of penis envy. He still says, “After all, the anatomical distinction [between the
sexes] must express itself in psychical consequences” (Freud [1932]; 154). Castration
complex and penis envy, which are based on anatomical difference, explain the riddle of
femininity. Why did Freud betray his promise? In my opinion, he was not able to explain
femininity sociologically; he already assumes socially determined femininity to be the
normal or the natural. Unless he gives up this assumption about femininity, he could not
solve the riddle of femininity.
(3)

The Production of New Questions

Then, what is the fundamental assumption o f Freud on femininity? In my opinion,
it is the assumption that only heterosexuality is normal. According to this assumption,
women’s love-object has to be men and the genuine genital for women is only a vagina.
The existence of women has meaning only in regard to the reproduction of babies. On the
left, there is a bisexual disposition. On the right, there is a “normal” femininity. What
matters is to ask why and how the transition from the left to the right happens.
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The act of asking is to choose, and therefore, it already includes what can be
answered and what cannot. Freud was not able to see outside the cultural context of his
times. Instead o f blaming Freud for his male bias, we have to read him “symptomatically.”
The assumption that only heterosexuality is normal is not only Freud’s theoretical
assumption, but also the compulsory demand of modem. Western male culture. Reading
Freud, we come to understand modem Westem culture and its logic.
What are the characteristics of this world Freud describes? First, Freud’s world is
characterized by ocularcentrism. Only the visible exists and is privileged. Second, this
ocularcentrism is directly connected with phallocentrism. The privilege of the penis comes
from the privilege o f sight. But, Freud does not explain why he gives privilege to sight
among other senses. Again, this is a visible world; the invisible does not exist, if it exists,
it is defined only by the visible. The vagina is invisible, so it does not exist; if it exists, it is
defined only by the visible, a penis. All negative attributes were given to the invisible,
femininity. Third, Freud’s world is also characterized by (re)production. Femininity has
its meaning as far as it is connected into the (re)production of a new member of the
world. Women’s libido was compulsorily directed towards only the function of
reproduction by male culture. Therefore, only the vagina is the true female genital.
Masturbation, which means an active action, of the clitoris, should be forbidden in this
culture. As a result, the relation between the little girl and her mother which is beyond the
aim o f (re)production is erased in this world.
Then, what is the logic of constituting this world? That is an Oedipal story which
has tremendous material effects. This story is not merely a story; it has a referent in the
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actual world, the penis. Without the penis, there is no Oedipus story. In other words, the
Oedipus story is only a male story. In this story, the female is (re)produced as a sexual
object of the male. There is no position allowed to the female as the subject. According
to Freud, one’s identity is constituted in the process of the dissolution of the Oedipus
complex. The little boy comes to identify with his father while maintaining his affectionate
relationship with his mother. In a sense, he loses nothing; rather, he is guaranteed to share
future power by his father’. The little girl comes to identify with her (castrated, therefore
impotent) mother while she has to give up her masturbation o f her clitoris. She gains
nothing; rather, she comes to hate her mother and is permanently caught with penis-envy.
This story constructs the ocularcentric and phallocentric culture, and in turn is
(re)constructed by it.
So far, we have described the characteristics of modem Westem culture Freud
described and its constitutive logic. According to Freud’s description, modem Westem
culture is based on biology (sight and penis) and superimposed by sociology (privilege o f
sight and penis). Freud assigned special status to sight without explaining why he did.
Thus, this produces a new question about the status of other sensations. This question is
later asked by Lacan’s mirror stage and the feminists’ emphasis on the pre-Oedipal stage
which is characterized by a flux of sensations. This question is also directly connected
with the question of the specific relation between the little girl and her mother at the stage
o f the pre-Oedipal and post-Oedipal stage. Freud argued that at the pre-Oedipal stage, the
relation between the little girl and the mother is different from one between the little boy

’ . Of course, the little boy is castrated by the father.
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and the mother, but he did not explain what the difference is. After Freud, feminists have
tried to explain it. Freud also described that since the Oedipal stage, female sexual identity
seems to be unstable, but he was not able to explain why. This produces questions about
the female body and the fragmental characteristics of modem Westem male culture. After
Freud, some feminists argued that the female body has an ontological difference from the
male one and others emphasized that modem Westem culture is a field o f struggling of
ideologies.
2. Lacan: The Oedipus Story as a Discourse
While Freud discovered the constitutive logic of modem Westem culture, the
Oedipus story, and gave it a scientific status, Lacan made it clear that the Oedipus story
was a specific discourse in modem Westem culture. If it is a discourse, it can be re
written. Re-writing the Oedipus story, Lacan articulated the ontological inevitability of
visual representation (ocularcentrism) and its relation to the phallus (phallocentrism).
Visual representation which first occurred during the mirror stage is the ontological basis
for the primary identification with the idealized imago reflected in a mirror, and further
influenced the secondary identification with the position whose value is determined by the
relation to the phallus. The phallus functions as not only a designating mark of mother’s
lack but also a remainder of the imaginary wholeness smashed by the Symbolic. While the
male subject has a phantasmatic sense of wholeness by assuming that he has the phallus
which would fill the mother’s lack, the female subject becomes a sexual object of the male
subject by masquerading as the phallus, a desired object.
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(1)

Visual Representation and Its Relation to the Phallus

Like Freud, Lacan considers the phallus as the maker of sexual difference. The
phallus breaks the dyadic relation between mother and child, and thereby constitutes the
identity o f a subject. While for Freud the phallus is a biological penis, for Lacan it is
illusory, fictitious, and imaginary*. The phallus exists in a kind o f fantasy realm which
merges desire with power, omnipotence, and wholeness. Lacan says, “the relation of the
subject to the phallus is set up regardless of the anatomical difference between sexes”
(Lacan [1958a]; 76). The important thing is that the illusory, fictitious, and imaginary
feature o f the phallus is based on the visual representation.
As we examined in chapter 2, Lacan argued that the human infant has a natural
tendency to imaginary identification with its imago reflected in the mirror. It is an
“ontological structure o f the human world”. Through visual representation, the human
infant has the sense of its wholeness, the moi. At the mirror stage, the human infant is
dominated by visual sensation, which is a scientific fact. Other animals also show the same
phenomena, but their mechanism is fimdamentally different. Only the human infant

*. There are other differences between Freud and Lacan. The most important difference
in accounting for female sexual identity between Freud and Lacan is as follows: Freud
contends that only the female is castrated, but Lacan holds that both male and female are
castrated the moment they enter into the Symbolic. Lacan also agrees that the first loveobject in both sexes is their mother, and in the Imaginary order both male and female
i n ^ t s have the primal (imaginary) identification with their mother. But the intrusion of
the third person, the Father, who represents the law of the Symbolic, represses the
children’s love-cathexis for their mother, and castrates both male and female infants; the
giving-up o f love-cathexis for their mother means being (culturally) castrated. Gallop
explains this characteristics of castration well: “castration for Lacan is not only sexual;
more important, it is also linguistic: we are inevitably bereft of any masterful
understanding o f language, and can only signify ourselves in a symbolic system that we do
not command, that, rather, commands us” (Gallop 1985: 20).
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identifies its image reflected in a mirror with the “idealization” of it. Without idealization
of the identified object, there is no imaginary identification. This imaginary identification
with the ideal-I alienates the subject fi-om the real. The first object of identification is the
human infant’s own body, part of it, or the mother. At this mirror stage, the human infant
maintains an undifferentiated dyadic relationship with its mother. Its mother is omnipotent
to the human infant because she satisfies all its biological needs. This dyadic relation
cannot be easily smashed; the mother is idealized.
In his article of 1958, “The Significance o f the Phallus”, Lacan extends the logic of
the visual world to the symbolic world. As the so-called “fort-da” game shows, the child
often suffers from pain due to the absence of its mother and tries to master the pain by
articulating it as a form of language. As soon as the child articulates its need as a
language, its need comes to be changed into demand. The child has to articulate its
biological need as a linguistic form of demand because language compensates the loss of
the mother (mother’s absence). Demand is the consequence of subjection of the need to
the regulation of language. To Lacan, language is first of all the system of “signifiers”;
“the signifier has an active function in determining certain effects in which the signifiable
appears as submitting to its mark, by becoming through that passion the signified” (Lacan
[1958a]: 284). Demand, which is a need articulated in language form, can never be
satisfied because one signifier only signifies other signifiers. From this
impossibility of satisfaction o f demand, desire stems. The development of the child is
ordered during the dialectic o f the demand for love and the test of desire.
“Desire”, Grosz says, “always refers to a triangle —the subject, the other and the
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Other. The other is the object through whom desire is returned to the subject; the Other is
the locus of signification which regulates the movement by which this return is possible”
(Grosz 1990: 80). The child (the subject) comes to realize that its mother (the other)
desires the phallus of the father (the signifier o f the desire of the Other), and it desires its
mother’s desire, not its mother: “If the desire of the mother is the phallus, the child wishes
to be the phallus in order to satisfy that desire” (Lacan [1958a]: 289). The phallus is not
only a biological penis, but also the privileged signifier: “The phallus is the privileged
signifier o f that mark [the mark that the human is related as a subject to the signifier] in
which the role of the logos [the order of signifiers —the symbolic order] is joined with the
advent of desire” (Lacan [1958a]: 287). As far as the phallus is a signifier, it is subject to
the law o f the Other. In modem Western culture, the Other is a locus of the male
discourse which defines women not-having-penis, a lack. Why is the phallus chosen as the
privileged signifier among a lot of signifiers? Lacan explains, “It can be said that this
signifier is chosen because it is the most tangible element in the real of sexual copulation
and also the most symbolic in the literal (typographical) sense of the term, since it is
equivalent there to the (logical) copula. It might be also said that, by virtue o f its
turgidity, it is the image of the vital flow as it is transmitted in generation” (Lacan [1958a]:
287, my italics). As this quotation shows, why the phallus is chosen as the privileged
signifier is that it is most “tangible.” I interpret “tangible” as “visible.”
The visible characteristic of the penis overwhelms the imaginary unity with the
mother brought by the visual sensation. In other words, the primary identification with the
imago (the imagined, omnipotent mother, therefore, idealized mother) is eclipsed by the
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secondary identification with the imago of the penis, the phallus (the imagined, omnipotent
father, therefore, idealized father). The visible characteristic of the penis informs the
human infant that the mother is lack o f the penis. Through this realization, each sex
begins to hold each position imposed by the Phallus. Therefore, the phallocentrism
directly comes firom the privilege o f the vision; ocularcentrism is a basis for
phallocentrism. In this sense, Lacan can be criticized as the master of the masculine
discourse. For Lacan, there is an ontological bridge between ocularcentrism and
phallocentrism. Phallocentirsm seems to come fi'om the ontological structure o f the
human being.
But this is a half story Lacan tells us. Phallus is originally based on the biological
referent (the penis) and the ontological privilege o f the sight. When the human infant
realizes that the imagined omnipotent mother is in fact an alienated subject in language and
she also desires the phallus, the phantasmatic signifier which seemingly satisfies her desire,
it also falls into metonymic displacement of signifiers. The phallus as a signifier always
signifies other signifiers which seemingly fill the subject’s lack, therefore, ocularcentrism
and phallocentrism are permanently reproduced. In short, the visibility of the penis
invokes the imagination which it has a power to fill the subject’s lack; the penis becomes
the phallus as a signifier. The phallus as a signifier perpetually reproduces the
phallocentrism.
In ocularcentric and phallocentric culture, masculinity is constructed around the
signifier of the phallus, a signifier which confers power in modem Western culture; by
contrast, femininity is constructed through exclusion from the symbolic realm o f power.
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Therefore, man is defined as “having-phailus” and woman is defined as “not-havingphallus” or “being-phallus”: “Let us say that these relations [between the sexes] will turn
around a ‘to be’ and a ‘to have’, which, by referring to a signifier, the phallus, have the
opposed effect, on the one hand, of giving reality to the subject in this signifier, and, on
the other, of derealizing the relations to be signified” (Lacan [1958a]: 289). Femininity
comes to a masquerade because it is phantasized as “being-phallus” by the male. But the
result is woman’s alienation from herself: “I am saying that it is in order to be the phallus,
that is to say, the signifier of the desire of the Other, that a woman will reject an essential
part of femininity, namely, all her attributes in the masquerade” (Lacan [1958a]: 289 - 90).
Then, what does the masquerade (being-phallus) mean? It means that women as
being-phallus become exchangeable objects among men. Grosz says, “She
paints/shaves/plucks/dyes/diets/exercises her body, and clearly derives pleasure from
complements about her look. Her whole body becomes the phallus to compensate for
genital ‘deficiency’, which she is able to disavow through her narcissism” (Grosz 1990:
133). In the modem Western ocularcentric and phallocentric culture, woman can be the
phallus only through masquerade, and in doing so she can be a desired object of men, not
the desiring subject. But as soon as the masquerade is put off she is degraded down to an
undesirable object. Man begins to find another woman who is masquerading as a beingphallus: “his own desire for the phallus will make its signifier emerge in its persistent
divergence towards “another woman” who may signify this phallus in various ways, either
as a virgin or as a prostitute” (Lacan [1958a]: 290).
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(2)

The Object a and Jouissance

To Lacan, female sexual identity does not belong to the female because it is
defined purely by the male (sexual identity). The masculine subject projects his “lack”
onto the female and idolizes the female. The loss o f the first love-object inscribes a
permanent lack in the male subject; the male fantasizes the female as the lost love-object,
the object a, which is the cause of desire and support o f male fantasy. In this sense, the
object a is not a real object, but an imaginary object. The object a as an imaginary object
keeps to remind the subject of the lost love-object, the real object.
The prototype of the object a is the mother(’s breast) which was considered as a
part of the infant’s own body by the infant. Although the male infant gives up his lovecathexis for his mother (mother’s breast) due to fear o f castration, his “unconscious”
desire for the first love-object is never given up. In other words, he gives up the “object”
of desire, but he does not give up the desire “itself.” As a result of this doubleness, the
male comes to idolize women, or put women in the position of the Other^.

®. This seems to be connected to Freud’s explanation of fetishism as a unique phenomena
for men. In “Fetishism” (1927), Freud contends that only men have the possibility of
fetishizing. According to Freud, fetishism arises fi'om the little boy’s horror at first seeing
the female genitals, so fetishism is only a male phenomenon. The first object of love for
both sexes is the mother, but the process of detachment fi'om the mother is different. The
little boy at first thinks that his mother also has a penis (phallic mother), but later he
discovers that she does not have it. The little boy tries to deny it, but later thinks that his
mother is castrated by his father. The little boy comes to fear being castrated by his father
because he sees his father as his rival. Because of the castration complex, the little boy
turns away firom his mother to identify with his potent father and in doing so, he
accomplishes “normal” heterosexuality. Because the detachment fi'om the mother gives
the little boy pain, he keeps denying the sexual difference by reasserting a penis-substitute
onto his mother (women). The fetish object stands in for the mother’s phallus; “[T]he
fetish is a substitute for the women’s (mother’s) phallus which the little boy once believed
in and does not wish to forgo” (Freud [1927]: 205). The Oedipus complex is resolved,
but it comes down into the unconscious as repressed. Therefore, men “normally and
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The object a is both a part o f the child’s body and what can be detached from the
body in order to become an external object; “The object a is something from which the
subject, in order to constitute itselfi has separated itself off as organ. This serves as a
symbol o f the lack, that is to say, o f the phallus, not as such, but insofar as it is lacking. It
must, therefore, be an object that is, firstly separable, and secondly, that has some relation
to the lack” (Lacan [1964a]: 103). The object a as an imaginary object becomes a
symbolic object (signifier) exchangeable in the Symbolic.
The object a is intimately connected with the phallus. As the mother’s breast is
detached from the child’s own body, the phallus is detached from the mother’s body (the
little boy thinks that his father castrated his mother or his father detached the phallus from
his mother’s body —the little boy’s own body). In modem Western phallocentric culture,
the phallus is heir to the role of object a. Whereas the male fetishizes about a part of
women’s body or idolizes her as the object a, the female responds to this men’s desire by
making herself as a desirable object of men. Women as being-phallus become
exchangeable objects because the phallus as the object a can be detached. The system of
prostitution, in which women are sold among men by men, is rooted in this phallocentric
logic.
As we have seen, the object a has two aspects: imaginary object and symbolic
object (signifier). There is also another aspect: the reminder of the real object. Why the

naturally” have the potential for fetishizing about women’s body parts. But according to
Freud, the little girl first becomes aware o f her own inferior clitoris on seeing a boy’s
penis, and this gives rise to penis envy. The little girl feels hostility towards her mother;
her mother does not give the little girl a penis. The little girl “normally” turns away from
her mother to her father in order to take a penis substitute, a male baby by her father.
Therefore the little girl does not have to fetishize.
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object a functions as a cause o f desire is that it reminds the subject of the lost love-object,
the real object. Before the imaginary relation between the infant and the mother, there
was the Real. Nobody can directly gain access to the Real; it is beyond the Symbolic. We
can only vaguely grasp the Real through symptom or trauma which interrupts the
automatic unfolding o f the signifying chain. The object a is the residue of symbolization,
which contains some o f the real. In other words, the object a is the symbolized real.
Therefore, the object a is the imaginary object reminding o f the real, which later becomes
an exchangeable object, a signifier.
According to Lacan, the human subject as an alienated existence can feel itself as a
(non-alienated) being through relating itself to the Real. In the Real, the human being
experienced jouissance, “a pleasure that is excessive, leading to a sense of being
overwhelmed or disgusted, yet simultaneously providing a source of fascination” ( Fink
1995: xii). The object a reminds the subject of this jouissance. That is why the object a is
a cause of desire, not an object o f desire. In modem Western culture, the phallus as a heir
to the object a promises a phallic or symbolic jouissance whose boundaries are determined
by the phallic function. The phallic function refers to “t/ie function that institutes lack,
that is, the alienating function o f language” (Fink 1995: 103). When the infant is castrated
by language, it has to give up its (original, presymbolic) jouissance. This castration
institutes lack in the speaking subject, and this lack in turn instigates the movement o f
desire whose aim is to stop up the lack. The object a is imagined as a real object to stop
up this lack. In modem Westem culture, the phallus plays the role of the object a. By
relating himself to the phallus, the masculine subject enjoys the symbolic jouissance.
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Woman can also enjoy this jouissance, but only as far as she takes the masculine position
as her own. But that jouissance is not a true jouissance of woman.
In his later article, “God and the Jouissance of the Women” (1972 - 3), Lacan
articulates another concept ofjouissance, called the Other jouissance, a mystery state of
sexual joy, an erotic satisfaction which dissolves the boundaries of self and Other. The
Oihtr Jouissance refers to a condition which is not contaminated by phallocentric
discourse: “There is a jouissance, since we are dealing withjouissance, a jouissance of the
body which is, if the expression be allowed, beyond the phalluJ^ (Lacan [1972-3] : 145).
According to Lacan, woman has her own proper jouissance: “There is a jouissance proper
to her, to this ‘her’ which does not exist and which signifies nothing. There is a
jouissance proper to her and of which she herself may know nothing, except that she
experiences it —that much she does know. She knows it of course when it happens. It
does not happen to all o f them” (Lacan [1972-3]: 145).
But we saw above, all women do not experience the Other jouissance. For
women, the Other jouissance is a structural potentiality. When a woman is alienated
in/through language, she is not altogether subject to the symbolic order like a man. Fink
explains, “Whereas S 1 (the Father’s ‘No!’) functions for a man as a limit to his range of
motion and pleasures, 5 1 is an elective ‘partner’ for a woman, her relationship to it
allowing her to step beyond the boundaries set by language and beyond the pittance of
pleasure language allows. An endpoint for men, S 1 serves as open door for women”
(Fink 1995: 107). The Other jouissance as a structural potentiality is beyond the symbolic,
and therefore, it cannot be known in modem Westem culture. Grosz says, “Woman
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experiences a jouissance beyond phallus. But if this enigmatic jouissance is attributed to
woman as her mark o f resistance to the Other, at the same time, this jouissance is, by that
fact, strictly outside o f articulation and is thus unknowable" (Grosz 1990: 139). What
does ’'''unknowable" mean? There are two possibilities for interpreting this. First, Lacan
has recourse to a biological (mystic) concept o f jouissance in order to escape from his
overarching and monolithic concept of the Symbolic order. I do not accept this
interpretation because it supposes the insoluble opposition between biology and sociology.
Second, we can think that jouissance cannot be known “under ocularcentric and
phallocentric discourse.” I accept this interpretation because it opens the possibility of
change of ocularcentric and phallocentric culture. Then the focus is to “re-write”
ocularcentric and phallocentric discourse, I think.

(B) Feminist Discourse on the Feminine Subject
Both Freud and Lacan characterized modem Westem culture as ocularcentrism
and phallocentrism. Luce Irigaray and Julia Kristeva accept this analysis and try to subvert
this culture. They work with the questions which Freud produced: questions on the
(female) body and the relation between the little girl and the mother during the preOedipal stage. Following Lacan, they also recognize the significance o f language; for
them, the key issue is the relation between woman and writing or language in general.
They characterize a unique women’s language as antiocular.
1.

Luce Irigaray: Rewriting Sexual Difference

Irigaray might be characterized by her synthesis of Derridean deconstructionism
and Lacanian psychoanalysis (Burke 1994; Jay 1994). To her, Derrida is important
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because he probes the identity of phallus and logos in Westem philosophy. According to
Derrida, Westem philosophy is structured in terms o f binary oppositions such as
good/bad, presence/absence, mind/matter, being/non-being, identity/diSerence,
culture/nature, signifier/signified, speech/writing, etc. Further, there is a hierarchy; the
first term is given privilege. The first positive term disavows its intimate dependence on
its negative term and masquerades itself as self-present truth. Westem philosophy has
been obsessed with this knowledge: “being, language, knowledge are self-evident, neutral
and transparent terms. Being can be known and experienced in its intimacy; language
transfers meaning neutrally without interfering in the underlying thoughts it ‘expresses’;
knowledge undistortedly reflects reality in truthful representations” (Grosz 1989: 28).
Thus, Derrida calls Westem philosophy “metaphysics o f presence” which identifies
knowledge with self-present truth (Norris 1987). But it is impossibly ideal because it in
fact depends on its negative terms. Therefore, logocentrism can be said to refer to “an
attitude of nostalgia for a lost presence or a longing for some first cause of being and
meaning” (Burke 1994: 42)*“. Derrida’s term “phallogocenrtrism” informs that the
oppositional structure on which logocentrism relies is governed by the division between
men and women (non-men). The dichotomy o f men and women as non-men is a
prototype of all kinds o f binary oppositions. Psychoanalysis shows that this dichotomy
comes from the privilege o f vision. The visible is present and the invisible is absent. The
penis is a symbol o f presence; it is visible. Thus, logocentrism is based on phallocentrism
whose logic comes from ocularcentrism. In this sense. Jay calls it “phallogocularcentrism”

*“ . In this sense, logocentrism is an attitude of the masculine subject who I defined
earlier.
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(Jay 1994).
For Irigaray, psychoanalysis has double meaning: it is a model o f male discourse
which can only represent the imaginary and the symbolic from the point of view o f the
boy; it is also a mode of reading or interpreting texts (Grosz 1989; Whitford 1991).
Psychoanalytic discourse states explicitly the various presumptions and beliefs about
femininity left unspoken by other discourses. Also it provides a reading or writing
strategy; it makes explicit who speaks, writes, and reads.
According to Irigaray, psychoanalysis as a reading or writing strategy should work
directly on enimciation (the place of the speaking subject) rather than, like the linguist or
the psychologist, working on the ertonce (the subject of statement). She tries to analyze
the enunciation of the speaking subject in order to uncover the true identity of the subject
who assumes the enonce, and theorizes the condition for a female subject which could not
be simply incorporated back into the male imaginary as its “other.” Following
Benveniste**, Irigaray defines th a t‘T ’ and “you” belong to enunciation, and meta-language
belongs to enonce. Meta-language is a male language, in which the m ale‘T ’ is assumed as
the third person or neutral position (the enonce or the subject of statement). But this is
impossible; nobody can “comment on one’s own enunciatory position while

**. Benveniste divides language into two persons, the T ’ and the “you”, and claims that
only the “F and “you” refer to persons. The third person is an absent person. The third
person has a representational rather than an enunciatory or positional ftmction. “Thus the
indicators I and you carmot exist as potentialities; they exist only insofar as they are
actualized in the instance o f discourse, in which, by each of their own instances, they mark
the process of appropriation by the speaker” (Benveniste 1971: 220); “Thus, in the
formal class o f pronouns, those said to be o f the ‘third person’ are, by their function and
by their nature, completely different from / and yon. ..Certain languages show that the
‘third person’ is indeed literally a ‘non-person’” (Benveniste 1971: 221).
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simultaneously occupying it” (Whitford 1991: 41). In other words, meta-language is a
false fantasy because nobody can hold both the positions of enunciation and enonce
simultaneously. Male meta-language asserts the neutrality or scientificality of discourse,
but it is just a male form of representation in which the female cannot be represented.
Irigaray’s purpose is to unveil the disguised meta-language of the male‘T ’ which has been
prevalent in Westem philosophy.
With the aid of psychoanalysis which works on enunciation, Irigaray analyses the
structure of “specularization” of Westem culture. Irigaray argues that all of westem
discourse and culture display the structure of specularization, in which the male projects
his own ego onto the world, which then becomes a mirror that enables him to see his own
reflection wherever he looks. Women as bodies/matters are the material of which the
mirror is made, that part of the mirror which cannot be reflected, the tain of the mirror for
example, and so they never see reflections of themselves:
...in order to trans-form his death drives and the whole instinctual
dualism, in order to use his life to ward off death for as long as it takes to
choose a death, man will have to work on building up his ego. On raising
his own tomb, if you like. This new detour along the road to death,
through/for the construction o f narcissistic monuments, involves pulling
the libido back from the object onto the self and desexualizing it so it can
carry out more sublimated activities. Now, if this ego is to be valuable,
some ‘mirror’ is needed to reassure it and re-insure it of its value. Woman
will be the foundation for the specular duplication, giving man back ‘his’
image and repeating it as the ‘same’” (Irigaray 1985a: 54).
As the word “mirror” implies, Irigaray clearly knows that the Freudian world is a visible
one in which only the visible exists and has privilege. Fear of castration is actually the fear
of “blindness”; if he becomes blind, he cannot see his penis, and therefore, he carmot verify
that his penis (the visible) is superior to woman’s clitoris (the invisible). The
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specularization o f Westem philosophy depends on the mirror whose matter consists of
woman as non-man. This world is a world of sameness in which otherness should be
negated in order to become a mirror o f sameness; “Woman will therefore be this sameness
—or at least its mirror image —and, in her role o f mother, she will facilitate the repetition
of the same, in contempt for her difference. Her own sexual difference” (Irigaray 1985a:
54). Westem culture is constructed over a buried act of matricide: “Furthermore, when I
speak of the relationship to the mother, I mean that in our patriarchal culture the daughter
is absolutely unable to control her relation to her mother. Nor can the woman control her
relation to maternity, unless she reduces herself to that role again... there is no possibility
whatever, within the current logic of sociocultural operations, for a daughter to situate
herself with respect to her mother: because, strictly speaking, they make neither one nor
two, neither has a name, meaning, sex of her own, neither can be ‘identified’ with respect
to the other” (Irigaray 1985b: 143).
If it is impossible for women to be represented within Westem culture (or Lacan’s
Symbolic order), where can we find a possibility in which women can be represented?
According to Irigaray, the possibility comes firom the “ontological difference” of women.
First, the female body is different fi'om the male body. The female body is characterized as
plural and fluid while the male body as singular and solid, and this difference makes the
difference of sexuality between man and woman: “Whereas the penis is a singular organ
needing something outside itself to provide gratification, the viginal lips, clitoris, labia,
vulva, and so on, are multiple—‘this sex which is not one’—and thus capable o f self
touching” (Jay 1994: 535). The invisibility of woman’s organ is connected into its
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formlessness: “This organ which has nothing to show for itself also lacks a form o f its
own” (Irigaray 1985b: 26). Woman’s body cannot be grasped by the male “scopic”
economy; the female sexuality is distinguished by touching whereas the male sexuality is
characterized by seeing. Touching or the tangible has different logics and rhythms from
the visual: “the tangible provides the preconditions and the grounds o f the visible... the
visible requires the tangible but the tangible is perfectly capable o f an existence
autonomous from the visible...The tangible is the invisible, unseenable milieu of the visible,
the source of visibility; it precedes the distinction between active and passive and subject
and object” (Grosz 1994: 106).
Then, what is the relation between the female body which has the characteristics
mentioned above and language? Irigaray argued that there is an isomorphism between
male sexuality and patriarchal language: “All Westem discourse presents a certain
isomorphism with the masculine sex; the privilege of unity, form o f the self, of the visible,
of the specularisable, of the erection (which is the becoming in a form)” (Irigaray 1977:
64). Similarly, there seems to be an isomorphism between female sexuality and woman’s
writing or language. According to Irigaray, Woman’s writing is characterized by fluids,
which is based on the female body. Irigaray says, “This ‘style’, or ‘writing’, of women
tends to put the torch to fetish words, proper terms, well-constructed forms. This ‘style’
does not privilege sight; instead, it takes each figure back to its source, which is among
other things tactile” (Irigaray 1985b: 79).
Second, the pre-Oedipal relation between the girl and the mother is different from
the one between the boy and the mother. In order to understand this assertion, we have to
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discuss the so-called “fort-da” game again. As we examined earlier, Freud contends that
the little boy does this game in order to symbolize the absence and presence o f the mother.
Through this game, the little boy overcomes the pain brought on by the absence of the
mother. Lacan re-interprets this “fort-da” game with a linguistic model. Lacan views this
game as an allegory about the linguistic mastery of the drives; he associates this mastery
with a signifying transaction by means o f which the unconscious is established. By this
game the child learns to control his feelings about the presence and absence o f the loved
object, the mother. The insertion of language into the child with the symbol of the reel
represses the child’s desire for its mother (the symbol o f the reel kills its mother), which
means the structuring o f the unconscious.
By contrast, Irigaray emphasizes that the player is the little “boy” and he masters
the absence of mother through manipulating a toy, an “object.” The little “boy” replaces
his “mother” (human subject) with a manipulable “object” which can be thrown away and
then retrieved. As soon as the male enters into language belonging to the Symbolic order,
he begins to manipulate the female. Under this culture, men sell and buy women, and
struggle with each other to earn the female. Therefore, violence is a fundamental
mechanism for maintaining this culture. From this game comes all male desires for
mastering, possessing, and manipulating women. Women, however, are ontologically
different from men in regard to this game:
She cannot reduce or manipulate her [her mother] as an object in the way a
little boy or a man does. According to Freud, and other theories of
sexuality in general, our desire is a desire for objects, and o f competition
for objects. Violence is thus explained by the need to posses objects and
the rivalry to take possession of them. A person’s status and even identity
is defined by the objects belonging to her or him. This economy is partially
valid for male subjectivity. Woman, though, immediately becomes a
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subject with respect to another subject who is the same as she: her mother.
She cannot reduce her mother to an object without reducing herself the
same way, because they are of same gender...The fort/da that Freud
describes as the child’s entry into the world o f language and culture does
not work properly for the girl, except through identification with the boy”
(Irigaray 1994: 18 - 19).
The peculiar relation between the daughter and the mother comes from the preOedipal stage, more specifically the pre-mirror stage. But it is unsymbolized under the
patriarchal symbolic order: “If the child’s pre-oedipal relation with the mother is ‘the dark
continent’ of psychoanalysis, then the mother-daughter relation must be ‘the dark
continent of the dark continent, the most obscure area o f our social order’” (Grosz 1989:
120). In this sense, the female imaginary, which comes fr-om the peculiar relation between
the daughter and the mother at the pre-Oedipal stage, has two aspects: 1) it is the
unsymbolized, repressed underside of westem philosophy; 2) it does not yet exist and it
still has to be created (Whitford 1991: 89). From the first aspect, the female imaginary
can be described as frisional, plural, no-identical. Within the male scopic economy, it
cannot be articulated because it is dominated by the economy of flow in which the tactile
is prevalent. The imaginary of women is different from the imaginary of men. The
imaginary of men is confined to only visual sensation; the male ego is a narcissistic object

preoccupied with its unified, visual image. By contrast, the imaginary of women is plural,
it involves other sensations repressed by the visual sensation. This imaginary consists of
the remnants left over by the structuration of the imaginary by the dominant symbolic
order: “if the female imaginary were to deploy itself, if it could bring itself into play
otherwise than as scraps, uncollected debris...” (Irigaray 1985b: 30). From the second
aspect, the relationship between the daughter and the mother should be articulated in
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another syntax; “How can the relationship between these two women be articulated? Here
‘for example’ is one place where the need for another ‘syntax’, another ‘grammar’ of
culture is crucial” (Irigaray 1985b; 143). In other words, women have to revive the
maternal genealogy and articulate their ontological difference in a form of representation
different from male one: “Woman must be able to express herself in words, images and
symbols in this intrasubjective relationship with her mother, then with other women, if she
is to enter into a non-discursive relationship with men” (Irigaray 1994: 20). Then, what
are the characteristics of feminine syntax? Irigaray says:
what a feminine syntax might be is not simple nor easy to state, because in
that ‘syntax’ there would no longer be either subject or object, ‘oneness’
would no longer be privileged, there would no longer be proper meanings,
proper names, ‘proper’ attributes... Instead, that ‘syntax’ would involve
nearness, proximity, but in such an extreme form that it would preclude any
distinction o f identities, any establishment of ownership, thus any form of
appropriation (Irigaray 1985b: 134).
Some interpreters o f Irigaray such as Janet Sayers and Lynne Segal call Irigaray a
(biological or psychic) “essentialist” (Whitford 1991: 9). But I do not agree with these
interpretations because the ontological difference of the female is not a biological or
psychic notion. The ontological difference of the female does not come from some pre
given essence, but from the female body and the specific “relationship” between daughter
and mother, which cannot be articulated within a patriarchal culture. In this sense, the socalled “ontological difference” is a grammatical difference: “the feminine sex’ is a point of
linguistic absence, the impossibility of a grammatically (my emphasis) denoted substance”
(Butler 1990: 10).
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2.

Julia Kristeva: Semiotic Foundation of Feminine Sexuality

Kristeva as a Lacanian psychoanalyst accepts the Lacanian critical thesis: the
Symbolic is constituted by the prohibitive paternal law*^. Kristeva tries to find a space to
disrupt the Symbolic by rewriting Freud’s pre-Oedipal stage. I am convinced that early
Kristeva especially concentrates on Freud’s new questions about femininity: about the
female body and the mother (especially the pre-Oedipal relation between the child and the
mother). She synthesizes these questions in terms o f the chora as the mother’s body:
“The chora is connotative of the mother’s body —unrepresentable body. The mother and
the body as such in fact go together for Kristeva” (Lechte 1990: 129). The chora as the
mother’s body is anti-ocularcentric and anti-phallocentric materiality of the symbolic: “The
mother’s body becomes the focus of the semiotic as the ‘pre-symbolic’—a manifestation—
especially in art, of what could be called the ‘materiality’ o f the symbolic: the voice as
rhythm and timber, the body as movement, gesture, and rhythm” (Lechte 1990: 129).
In her doctoral dissertation. Revolution in Poetic Language, ECristeva attempts to
revise the scope and the structure of Lacanian imaginary and symbolic order. She changes
the Imaginary and the Symbolic order into “the semiotic” and “the symbolic.” The
semiotic cannot be understood only in its Saussurian sense: Barthes’ writings on pleasure
and jouissance of the text opens the way to Kristeva’s study o f the disruptive jouissance
o f language which is characteristic o f the semiotic chora, Benveniste’s distinction between

. Kristeva cannot be understood only as a Lacanian psychoanalyst. Kristeva combines
Lacanian psychoanalysis, structural linguistics, and European philosophy in order to
produce a significant accoimt of the relations between unconscious desire, feminine
sexuality, and modem social process. Early Kristeva can be best understood in the
context o f the May o f 1968 in France. See Turkle ( 1992).
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enunciation and enonce influenced Kristeva’s theory o f the subject in process; Bataille’s
characterization of poetry as escaping the stricture of the symbolic order opens up the
terrain of Kristeva’s reflection on the semiotic (Lechte 1990). The semiotic has two
aspects 1) it refers to the pre-Oedipal modality of experience and the existence of oral and
anal drives, which includes bodily drives, feelings, and rhythms; 2) the semiotic as the preOedipal modality o f experience ceaselessly returns in all signifying practice. Kristeva says,
“The term semiotic...will be used to mean: in the first place, what can be hypothetically
posited as preceding the imposition of language, in other words, the already given
arrangement of the drives in the form of facilitations or pathways, and secondly the return
o f these facilitations in the form of rhythms, intonations and lexical, syntactic and
rhetorical transformations” (Kristeva, quoted in Grosz 1990: 152). The semiotic is also a
space before sexuality is set up: “It [the semiotic] is an anarchic, formless circulation o f
sexual impulses and energies traversing the child’s body before sexuahty is ordered and
hierarchically subsumed under the primacy o f gentility and the body becomes a coherent
entity” (Grosz 1989: 43). There is no sexual difference between two sexes in the semiotic;
the semiotic as “the presymbolic realm of signification associated with the mother” (Jay
1994: 458) has the same meaning for two sexes. The semiotic is anterior to the mirror
stage; it is not dominated by vision. Kristeva says, “this process [the process through
which the child grasp the image] can be called imaginary, but not in the specular sense of
the word, because it passes through voice, taste, skin and so on, all the senses yet doesn’t
necessarily mobilize sight” (Kristeva, quoted in Jay 1994: 531). Kristeva calls this space
the semiotic chora. The term “cAoru” originally comes from Plato: “We borrow the term
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chora from Plato’s Timeus to denote an essentially mobil and extremely provisional
articulation constituted by movements and their ephemeral stases” (Kristeva 1984; 25);
“Plato’s Timeus speaks of a chora, receptacle, unnamable, improbable, hybrid, anterior to
naming, to the One, to the father, and consequently, maternally connoted to such an extent
that it merits ‘not even the rank o f syllable’” (Kristeva 1980; 133). For Kristeva, the
chora is a function of the child’s unmediated relation to the mother’s body; “The mother’s
body is...what mediates the symbolic law organizing social relations and becomes the
ordering principle of the semiotic chord’’ (Kristeva 1984: 27). It is also a state in which
the linguistic sign has not yet been articulated as the absence of an object: “The chora is
not yet a position that represents something for someone (i.e., it is not a sign); nor is it a
position that represents someone for another position (i.e., it is not yet a signifier either)”
(Kristeva 1984: 26).
By contrast, the symbolic, for Kristeva, is similar to Lacan’s symbolic, language:
“We shall call symbolic the logical and syntactic functioning of language and everything
which, in translinguistic practices is assailable to the system o f language proper” (Kristeva,
quoted in Grosz 1990: 152). The child gains a sexualized position (sexual identity) within
language; language is governed by the Name-of-the-Father. Kristeva says, “The symbolic
order functions in our monotheistic West by means of a system of kinship dependent on
transmission of the fether’s name and a rigorous prohibition o f incest, and a system of
verbal communication that is increasingly logical, simple, positive, and stripped o f stylistic,
rhythmic, ‘poetic’ ambiguities” (Kristeva 1991: 31). In Westem society, the symbolic
order is characterized by patriarchy, which involves the domination of the “Law o f the
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Father” and the marginalization o f the semiotic, especially the place of the mother. But
unlike Lacan, For Kristeva language develops within the chora through the thetic phase.
Due to the positing of the thetic, the chora cannot be definitively posited. In this sense,
the semiotic and the symbolic are “inseparable in the signifying process that constitutes
language” (Kristeva 1984: 24).
What is important here is that the semiotic and the symbolic conflict with each
other: “If the symbolic established the limits and unity of a signifying practice, the semiotic
registers in that practice the effect o f that which cannot be pinned down as sign, whether
signifier or signified” (Kristeva, quoted in Grosz 1990: 152). In this sense, Kristeva
argues that the semiotic and the symbolic are two modalities of all signifying processes:
“the dialectic between them [the semiotic and the symbolic] determines the type of
discourse (narrative, metalanguage, theory, poetry, etc.) involved...Because the subject is
always both semiotic and symbolic, no signifying system he produces can be either
‘exclusively’ semiotic or ‘exclusively’ symbolic, and is instead necessarily marked by an
indebtedness to both” (Kristeva 1984: 24).
Unlike Lacan, Kristeva seems to give importance to the semiotic. If we equate the
semiotic with Lacan’s imaginary order including the mirror stage, we come to know that
they both refer to the pre-Oedipal stage, but their contents are very different. As we saw
above, Lacan’s imaginary order is characterized by the visual sensation of the infant. The
infant is demonstrated as a narcissistic object preoccupied with its visual image. But, the
pre-Oedipal stage o f Freud is much more complex and dynamic; it involves the anarchic
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component-drives and polyraorphomous erotogenic zones. Kristeva revives Freud’s
notion of the pre-Oedipai stage by dividing it into the semiotic and the thetic.
The term “thetic” originally comes from Husserl; “We SHALL distinguish the
semiotic (drives and their articulations) from the realm of signification, which is always
that of a proposition or judgment, in other words, a realm of positions. This positionality,
which Huserlian phenomenology orchestrates through the concepts of doxa, position, and
thesis, is structured as a break in the signifying process, establishing the identification of
the subject and its object as preconditions of positionality. We shall call this break, which
produces the positing of signification, a thetic phase” (Kristeva 1984; 43). All enunciation
is possible only when the subject separates itself from both its image and its objects as well
as it identifies with an object. In this sense, the thetic is the deepest structure o f the
possibility of enunciation: “The child’s first so-called holophrastic enunciations include
gesture, the object, and vocal emission. Because they are perhaps not yet sentences (NPVP), generative grammar is not readily equipped to account for them. Nevertheless, they
are already thetic in the sense that they separate an object from the subject, and attributes
to it a semiotic fiiagment, which thereby becomes a signifier” (Kristeva 1984: 43). In
Husserlian terminology, ‘“ positing is a nominal act in which the object presented is
referred to as existing, which involves an active, rational commitment on the part of the
thinker” (Payne 1993: 173); positing is a rational act of transcendental ego. But in
Kristevian terminology, positioning is an act achieved through the specific developmental
phase: “thetic signification is a stage attained under certain precise conditions during the
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signifying process” (Kristeva 1984: 44). The thetic phase of the signifying process
includes the mirror stage and the discovery of castration.
Whereas the specular image of the mirror stage provides the child with a
representation that is based on wholeness and unity, castration serves the child to form the
specular image o f wholeness, separating it from too close an identification with the phallic
mother. Whereas the mirror stage refers to a detachment from the chora, castration refers
to the detachment from the phallic mother: “Captation of the image and the drive
investment in this image, which institute primary narcissism, permit the constitution of
objects detached from the semiotic chorcf (Kristeva 1984: 46); “The discovery o f
castration...detaches the subject from his dependence on the mother, and the perception of
this lack [manque] makes the phallic function a symbolic function - the symbolic function”
(Kristeva 1984: 47). Whereas during the mirror stage the child “posits” his imagined ego,
at the moment of the discovery of castration signification is structured in the subject.
Therefore, the thetic act, which was considered as the act of the transcendental ego by
Husserl, becomes exposed as the act attained during the thetic phase. Passing through the
thetic phase, the subject enters into the symbolic order: “The thetic phase marks a
threshold between two heterogeneous realms: the semiotic and the symbolic” (Kristeva
1984: 48). What is important here is that the thetic cannot be characterized by the
oppression of the semiotic chora; its function is the positing o f not the repression o f the
semiotic chora: “the thetic is not a repression of the semiotic chora but instead a position
either taken on or undergone” (Kristeva 1984: 51).
Once the child enters into the symbolic order, the chora seems to be oppressed.
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This seeming oppression of the chora results in the repression of the semiotic in language
as well as the oppression of femininity in society. Under patriarchal symbolic order, both
the semiotic and women are subjected to marginal status. Unlike Lacan, Kristeva does not
see this marginalization (oppression) as complete oppression; she believes that the
semiotic continues to exert a more pervasive influence upon the symbolic. In the area of
language, the return of the semiotic, according to Kristeva, is well expressed in the avantgarde text: “Among the capitalist mode o f production’s numerous signifying practices,
only certain literary texts of the avant-garde (Mallarmé, Joyce) manage to cover the
infinity of the process, that is, reach the semiotic chora, which modifies linguistic
structures” (Kristeva 1984: 88). According to Kristeva, arts including the avant-garde can
transgress the boundaries of the symbolic order which is governed by the Law of the
Father. Where, then, does the power of transgressing the boundaries of the symbolic
order come from? It comes from the pre-Oedipal maternal body: “craftsmen of Westem
art reveal better than anyone else the artist’s debt to the maternal body and/or
motherhood’s entry into symbolic existence —that is, translibidinal jouissance, eroticism
taken over by the language of art” (Kristeva 1980: 243). Therefore, language practice
such as the avant-garde revives not only the semiotic chora, but also femininity. In this
sense, language practice or re-writing the discourse has political meaning; it seeks to
disrupt the symbolic governed by the Law of the Father. Both sexes have the potentiality
of practicing it because the subject, for Kristeva, is always both semiotic and symbolic.
Language practice such as poetic language demonstrates the subject as the subject-inprocess: “poetic language puts the subject in process/on trial through a network of marks
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and semiotic facilitations” (Kristeva 1984; 58). Both sexes can try to change the thetic by
activating the semiotic chora.
As we have examined, Kristeva’s theory on the chora is anti-ocular; “the chora
precedes and underlies figuration and thus specularization (my emphasis) and is analogous
only to vocal or kinetic rhythm” (Kristeva 1984: 26). Freud, Lacan, and Irigaray all agree
with the opinion that Westem phallocentric culture is characterized by the privilege o f the
sight (the visible). This visible world represses the pre-Oedipal modality of experience
which is characterized by the chora. The chora carmot be reduced to the visual sensation
(the sight) because it precedes specularization and is analogous to vocal or kinetic rhythm.
The chora carmot be exhausted by the symbolic; without it there is no signification.
Whereas the masculine discourse strives to establish a meta-narrative, which has the name
o f “science”, by using only the symbolic system, the semiotic chora always has the
possibility o f subverting it.
Kristeva’s theory on the chora is also based on the mother’s body. The mother’s
body plays an important role in ordering the chora. But, unlike Irigaray’s assertion of
women’s ontological difference, Kristeva disembodies the feminine and the matemal fi'om
women, particularly from the female body. According to Kristeva, femininity is not
woman’s nature, but something like the semiotic itself. Grosz says, “femininity is
identified with a series o f processes and relations that the pre-Oedipal child o f either sex
experiences and wants before the imposition o f sexual difference” (Grosz 1990: 161).
Similarly Toril Moi also says, “Kristeva herself has from time to time written about
femininity in terms which would seem to equate the feminine with the ‘semiotic’ or the
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pre-Oedipal” (Moi 1986; 11). This feminine and maternally structured space as the
semiotic is provided for both sexes. In the pre-Oedipal stage there is no sexual difference
between the two sexes; the semiotic has no special relation to woman. In the pre-Oedipal
stage, the mother is womb, breast, partial object rather than subject. The relationship
between mother and daughter is the same as the relationship between mother and son.
Therefore, the disruptive potential of the semiotic chora is available to both woman and
man.
Some theorists criticize Kristeva’s ±eory on the chora as political naturalism:
“There was a call for a return to a more direct, simpler experience, the return to Eden.
This naturalism stressed that if allowed free expression, man’s natural desires, energies,
and creative imagination would be a revolutionary force. Kristeva spoke about this force
as the semiotic and said that it had to confront the symbolic in order to serve the
revolution” (Turkle 1992: 84). But we have to remember that Kristeva’s intention is not
returning to the semiotic, but revitalizing the semiotic through signifying practices. Butler
also criticizes that Kristeva describes the matemal body as naturalistic and questions
whether the primary relationship to the maternal body is a knowable experience under her
and Lacan’s linguistic theories (Butler 1990: 80). These critics sound reasonable to some
extent if we equate Kristeva’s semiotic and symbolic with Lacan’s Imaginary and
Symbolic. But as we saw above, Kristeva’s thetic marks a significant difference from
Lacan. Kristeva’s symbolic is always in conflict with the semiotic; the thetic poses, not
oppresses, the semiotic. Butler does not say anything about the thetic; she just opposes
the semiotic as natural to the symbolic as cultural and argues that the semiotic is
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subordinated to the symbolic. But in Kristeva’s world, the subject is not completely
subordinated by the symbolic. Like Freud’s early topography where the primary system
and the secondary system act on each other, Kristeva’s subject is always in the process.

Summary and Implication
Failing to explain the so-called riddle o f femininity, Freud discovered the
constitutive logic of modem Westem culture, the Oedipus story. Freud also produced
new questions on femininity; the characteristics of the pre-Oedipal stage and the female
body, which was not represented under modem Westem masculine culture characterized
by ocularcentrism and phallocentrism. Lacan made it explicit that the Oedipus story was a
specific discourse in modem Western culture and articulated the ontological inevitability
of visual representation and its relation to the phallus. Both o f them showed us that the
masculine subject is constituted by projecting his loss onto the female as a screen. Irigaray
revealed that the Oedipus story functions as a meta-language but it is in fact a masculine
discourse. Irigaray made a possibility o f a new feminine subject by rewriting the Oedipus
story. The ontological difference, in fact grammatical difference of the female, can
function as a source o f it. Kristeva also conceptualized a possibility of a new feminine
subject by rewriting Freud’s pre-Oedipal stage. Kristeva changed the Imaginary and the
Symbolic into the semiotic and the symbolic and conceptualized a dynamic relation
between them. Both sexes can become a new subject different from the masculine subject;
the subject is always both semiotic and symbolic. The problem is to vitalize signifying
practices such as the text practice of the avant-garde.
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CHAPTER 4

CONCLUSION; TOWARDS THE POLITICS OF SYMPTOM

While the subject is not substantial, his or her symptom is. In the symptom,
there is suffering, that is to say, jouissance. The body is involved, but not
only the body: all real behavior. When we say that the subject is
asubstantial, we shouldn’t forget that psychoanalysis claims to cure or to
change something at the level of the symptom, which is a substantial level,
by operating on the asubstantial subject. The ambition of psychoanalysis
is...vast. (Soler 1995: 44)

I have contended that the modem Western subject was a masculine subject who
strove to achieve a fixed identity (self-sameness) at the cost of negating others. Hegelian
subjects (the subject of desire and the subject of recognition) were taken as a prototype of
the modem Westem masculine subject. While the subject of desire who tries to reduce the
other to self-othering has the same function as Freud’s ego and Lacan’s moi, the subject of
recognition who seeks to achieve mutual recognition is Freud’s masculine subject and
Lacan’s speaking subject. The world of the former is the Lacanian world of the imaginary
characterized by the binary opposition of identity and difference. Here exists only love
(identification) or hate (rivalry). The world of the latter is the Lacanian world o f the
symbolic where the imaginary world was shattered by the third term as law or meta
language. This is the world o f the differences where each difference has its value only in
117
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regard to the third term.
I believe that modem Westem politics has been based on these two conceptions of
the subject.
The politics based on Hegel’s subject of desire, Freud’s ego or Lacan’s moi, I will call the
“politics o f identity.” This politics of identity follows the logic of the Imaginary, which
constmcts the subject (identity) by negating the other (difference). The subject sees itself
reflected in the other, and identifies itself with the positive characteristics and the other
with the negative characteristics. The subject and the other are thus constructed by
imaginary identification.
This imaginary world is thus characterized by “the master’s discourse”. On this
point, Lacan’s master’s discourse is similar to Hegel’s master’s discourse. In both, the
master is the master and the slave is the slave; no justification is given for the master’s
power and the slave’s powerlessness. The slave works and produces something. The
master just enjoys it.
The politics o f identity also can be characterized as a psychotic world. According
to Lacan, psychosis results firom the foreclosure of the paternal fimction. The main
function of the father is the symbolic function (symbolic castration) which overwrites the
imaginary According to Lacanian psychoanalysis, the “patemal metaphor creates a
foundational, unshakable meaning” (Fink 1997; 94). Based on this point de capiton
(anchoring point), language and meaning (reality as socially constituted) come together.
In the psychotic, this patemal function fails; “In psychosis, the patemal metaphor fails to
function and the structure of language (allowing for the possibility o f metaphorical
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substitution) is not assimilated” (Fink 1997; 94). The psychotic lives in the world of
things, not of words; the psychotic is not alienated in/by language, but has a certainty that
what he sees or hears (fantasy, physical reality) is reality. The psychotic is “not able to
distinguish between fantasy (physical reality) and reality (the Westem notion o f
social/physical reality he has assimilated in the course o f his lifetime)” (Fink 1997; 83). In
this sense, the subject o f the politics o f identity is the psychotic.
These notions o f the subject and the psychotic may also be used to define the
modem conception o f intemational politics in the colonial era. As an example, let’s see
how the United States depicted colonized Filipinos in the nineteenth century;
So long as he [the Filipino] gets his good and fair treatment, and his
stipulated wages paid in advance, he is content to act as a general utility
man. If not pressed too hard, he will follow his superior like a faithful dog.
Even over mud and swamp, a native is almost as sure-footed as a goat on
the brink of a quarry. I have fi’equently been carried for miles in a
hammock by four natives and relays through morassy districts too
dangerous to travel on horseback. They are great adepts at climbing
whatever it is possible for a human being to scale a height; like monkeys,
they hold as much with their feet as with their hands; they ride any horse
barebacked without fear, they are utterly careless about jumping into the
sea among the sharks, which sometimes they will intentionally attack with
knives, and I never knew a native who could not swim (Foreman 1899
quoted in Doty 1996; 39).
...a native family feeds; it does not breakfast or dine, it feeds. A wooden
bowl o f rice with perhaps a little meat stewed in with it, is put on the floor;
the entire family squats around it; the fingers are used to convey the food
into the mouth. I have never seen any Filipino eat otherwise (Lodge March
7, 1900 quoted in Doty 1996; 39)
Filipinos were imagined by the commanding gaze of the West as dogs, monkeys, and other
animals that feed rather than dine. The politics of identity defines the body, women, and
civilizations other than those in the West as others in terms of the self-othering of mind
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(spirit), men or Westem civilization. This politics is characterized by logocentrism,
androcentrism and Western ethnocentrism;
...because it [the United States] was ‘God’s best representative of law and
order and justice on earth’ (Spooner, Congressional Record, 55th
Congress, 3rd session, Febmary 2, 1899), it had a duty to annex the
Philippines (Doty 1996: 32, my italics).
At issue was whether the United States was to continue to be a place
‘where a man can stand up by virtue of his manhood and say I am a man'
or whether it was to be ‘so effeminate that we are incompetent to colonize,
to develop, and to govern territorial possessions’ (Hoar, January 9, 1899;
Nelson, January 20, 1899 quoted in Doty 1996: 30, my italics).
Wherever we have inferior and dependent races within our borders today,
we have a political problem —the Negro problem, the Chinese problem,
the Indian problem. These problems we slowly solve. Industrial training
and industrial pride make a man of the Negro. Industrial interests may
even make a man o f the Chinaman, and the Indian disappears as our
civilization touches him (Jordan 1901 quoted in Doty 1996: 43, my italics).
Doty rightly points out that, “At a more fundamental level, the Philippines were to become
a site for the self-elaboration o f the identity o f the United States” (Doty 1996: 28). This
narrative construction o f Filipino identity follows the logic of the imaginary order: the
United States States projects its lack (bad things) onto the Filipino as a screen, through
which it constructs its own identity as well as the Filipino’s identity as their self-othering.
Fink says, ‘“ Imaginary relations’ are not illusory relationships —relationships that don’t

really exist —but rather relations between egos, wherein everything is played out in terms
o f but one opposition; same or different” (Fink 1995; 84). The distinction between I and
you is based on a “visible” difference. As the infant’s ego at the mirror stage becomes
fascinated by its image reflected in a mirror, the United States in the colonial era becomes
fescinated by its image reflected in the Filipino. As the ego, upon the illusory self-image
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(misrecognition), attempts to make sense of the world around it, the United States, upon
its illusory identity-image (misrecognition), attempts to make sense of the world around it,
i.e., it attempts to produce “knowledge” (of itself and others).
The result o f the politics of identity is only the binary opposition of assimilation or
exclusion. In other words, as in the case of the imaginary structure of the dyadic
opposition o f identity and difference, the politics o f identity has an either/or logic. The
politics of identity, in contrast to its name, results in opposition rather than identity; selfidentity o f the subject is achieved only by the death of others or the reduction of others to
mirrors reflecting the subject. As Hegel said, this politics is a “life-and-death struggle”
and results in the death of others, and finally, the death of the subject itself. That is why
Freud calls ego-drive the death-drive.
The politics based on Hegel’s subject of recognition, Freud’s masculine subject or
Lacan’s speaking subject, I will call the “politics of representation^” The politics of
representation follows the logic o f the Symbolic, which constructs the subject and the

‘ . The term “politics of representation” is similar to Rosenau’s positivistic term “modem
politics o f representation” characterized by epistemologicsl objectivity and democratic
representation in politics. Rosenau summarizes it well as follows: “It [modem
representation] is delegation-, one individual represents another in parliament. It is
resemblance-, a painting represents on the canvas what the painter observes. It is
replication-, the photograph (image) represents the person photographed (object). It is
repetition-, a writer puts on paper the word (language) that represents his/her idea or
thought (meaning). It is substitution-, a lawyer represents a client in court. It is
duplication-, a photocopy represents the original” (Rosenau 1992; 92). But my term
“politics o f representaion” is also slightly different fi"om hers. My term “politics of
representation” comes fi’om the recognition that the others are the condition of my
existstence, and vice versa. In this politics, ‘T ’ and “other” strive towards mutual
recognition “within” the closed system like language as a web o f signifiers. Mutual
recognition is, thus, always deferred as meaning is always deferred in poststructural
language theory. But the third term fi-eezes meaning.
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Other (subject) in regard to their values imposed by the third term. The subject as well as
the other (subject) are subjugated to the Other, they are alienated in/by language (the
Symbolic). They were forced to give up their jouissance which had existed in the
imaginary/real and to hold the position imposed by the Symbolic, which is assumed to
substitute for the jouissance.
This symbolic world is characterized by “the university discourse.” In Lacan’s
university discourse, systematic knowledge is the ultimate authority; it provides a sort of
legitimization or rationalization of the master’s will. Fink says, “the truth hidden behind
the university discourse is...the master signifier. Knowledge here interrogates surplus
value...and rationalizes or justifies it” (Fink 1995 : 132). In the master’s discourse, the
master is just the master, the master is assumed to have the property o f the master in
himself. There is no explanation nor justification. But when the slave gradually realizes
that his labor produces the surplus value, he begins to struggle with the master. At this
moment, the university discourse explains why the master is master and the slave is the
slave. The third term is the criteria for judgment.
The politics o f representation can be characterized by the neurotic world.
According to Lacanian psychoanalysis, the neurotic results firom repression: “Lacan
sustains that what is repressed is neither perception nor affect, but the thoughts
pertaining to perceptions, the thoughts to which affect is attached. In other words, the
unconscious consists o f thoughts, and thoughts carmot but be expressed or formulated in
words —that is, with signifiers. Affect and thought are generally connected or linked at
the outset; but when repression occurs, affect and thought are generally detached fi-om
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each other, and the thought may be put out o f consciousness” (Fink 1997; 113). The
neurotic lives in the world o f words, not o f things; the neurotic is alienated in/by language.
In Lacanian psychoanalysis, the neurotic consists of the obsessive and the hysteric. While
the obsessive reduces the Other to the object a, the hysteric reduces the subject to the
object a as the diagrams below show.

Subject'-, a / Other /

\Subject \ a." Other

The Obsessive
Diagram 3

The Hysteric
Diagram 4

While diagram 3 shows that “the obsessive takes the object for himself and refuses to
recognize the Other’s existence” (Fink 1997; 119), diagram 4 shows that “the hysteric
seeks to divine the Other’s desire and become the particular object, when missing, makes
the Other desire” and “constitutes herself on the subject side of the ‘equation’ as object a ”
(Fink 1997: 120). The obsessive considers him self as a whole subject (who is not
alienated in language) and refuses to see himself as dependent on the Other. On the
contrary, the hysteric “emphasizes the partner or Other, making herself into the object of
the Other’s desire so as to master it” (Fink 1997: 123).
The politics o f representation would characterize the neo-colonial era. Let’s see
how the United States describes the relationship between the United States and the neo
colonized Philippines.
We of the United States feel that we are merely entering into a new
partnership with the Philippines —a partnership of two free and sovereign
nations working in harmony and understanding. The United States and its
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partner of the Pacific, the Philippine Republic, have already chartered a
pattern of relationships for all the world to study. Together, in the future,
our two countries must prove the soundness and the wisdom o f this great
experiment in Pacific democracy (From the message of President Truman
to the people o f Philippines, July 4, 1946. Quoted in Doty 1996; 79).
The Philippines are here positioned as a partner of the United States. The subject (the
United States) recognizes that the other (the Philippines) is a condition o f its existence.
Therefore, the subject (the United States) desires that the other (the Philippines) desire it
(the United States). The subject wants mutual recognition (parmership), but it is destined
to fail because it is actually an alienated subject (in the capitalist world system) as a
signifying system even though like the obsessive it thinks itself a whole subject.
Capitalism as a signifying system is structured around the master signifier (surplus value),
and therefore, the positionality o f each subject is imposed by the master signifier (surplus
value): core, semi-periphery and periphery, or the advanced, the developing, and the
underdeveloped. On the ideological level, fireedom and democracy (Westem notion) are
the counterparts of surplus value. The positionality of the subject (the democratic, the
totalitarian, the precocious children, etc) is imposed by the master signifier (fi’eedom and
democracy):
An understanding o f the Philippine people is essential, and their
shortcomings must be appraised against their historic background. A
usefiil analogy is to regard them as precious children without minimizing
their potential as future world citizens (From a memo prepared by the U.S.
Embassy in the Philippines in August 1951. Quoted in Doty 1996: 79).
The politics of representation recognizes the other’s difference but argues that the
difference has its value only in regard to the third term. The third term is in the place of
meta-position to articulate the truth, and only those who hold the meta-position represent
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the truth. Various discourses and ideologies struggle to assume the meta-position, which
is exemplified by the struggles of ideologies during the neo-colonial era. For the West the
third term was surplus value, freedom, democracy, etc.; for the East the third term was
use value, equality, liberation, etc. The two camps struggled to define “the Rest”
according to their third term and absorb “the Rest” into their systems.
But this politics is merely a sublimated form o f the politics of identity, aiming for
the death o f others. The aim of sublimation is to avoid death: “The imaginary is war, the
symbolic peace. The symbolic—the law —divides things up, providing a kind o f distibutive
justice: this is yours, that is mine” (Fink 1997: 98). As Lacan’s speaking subject achieves
the fentasized sense of wholeness of being through fantasized gaining of the object a, the
subject of this politics (the neurotic) achieves the fantasized totality of the world through a
fantasized holding of the meta-position. In this instance, the other (the hysteric) is merely
a signifier which has lost its matrix, exemplified by poststructuralist language theory’s
notion of the play of signifiers without any references. The subject is produced as an
effect when it holds the position imposed by the third term. In other words, the subject is
merely a position-holder, but he sees himself as a whole subject. The neo-colonized
people (especially their westernized intellectuals) as the other are subjugated to the desire
o f the Westem symbolic (the Other). They desire the Other’s desire: they try to be the
object a for the West and desire as the West does. Westernization is an absolute value for
them.
The result of the politics of representation is more complex than that o f the politics
of identity. Industrialization and westernization in the Third World varies from country to

R ep ro d u ced with p erm ission o f the copyright ow ner. Further reproduction prohibited w ithout p erm ission.

126

country. But it is evident that in no case is their mutual recognition. Some countries in
The Third World tried to follow the West, where other countries tried to refute the West.
But both of them were stuck in Eurocentrism. For example, nationalist and Marxist critics
of the West were also trapped in the master’s discourse: “when nationalism, reversing
Orientalist thought, attributed agency and history to the subjugated nation, it also staked a
claim to the order of Reason and Progress instituted by colonialism; and when Marxists
pilloried colonialism, their criticism was framed by a universalist mode-of-production
narrative” (Prakash 1995: 87). In any case, mutual recognition was always delayed. They
were not able to be the West (signifier). They were more than the West. They desired
that the West desire their desire. But their desire was actually the desire of the West; they
were alienated in the Westem symbolic. The West was also alienated in its symbolic
which is structured around the illusory third term. In the early neo-colonial era, the West
believed that there was meta-position (language). It was an ideology of false
consciousness: ’Uhey do not know it, but they are doing it” (Zizek 1989: 28). But in the
late neo-colonial era, the West came to realize that there is no meta-language, but the
West still acted as if there were a meta-language. It appeared in the new form of ideology
as cynicism: “they know very well what they are doing, but still, they are doing it” (Zizek
1989: 29).
The politics based on Freud’s subject o f the unconscious or Lacan’s subject o f the
real, I will call the “politics o f symptom.” This politics is periodized as the post-colonial
era. I mean by the post-colonial era as the time after (neo)colonialism. Colonialism is
characterized by its binary division between the colonizers and the colonized. In this
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sense, neocolonialism, characterized by a triad relation (the subject, the other subject, and
the third term), is a sublimated colonialism. Post-colonialists have defined post
colonialism as the deconstruction o f this binary division (Prakash 1995; Hall 1996). The
mixture of races, ethnicities, localities, cultures, etc. is celebrated; “this mixture of races,
rather than resulting in an inferior being, provides hybrid progeny, a mutable, more
malleable species with a rich gene pool” (Anzaldua 1987: 77). But some criticize the
post-colonial label for its theoretical and political ambiguity: “dizzying multiplicity of
positionalities,” “a-historical and universalizing displacements,” “depoliticizing
implications” (Shohat 1992); and “entranced suspension o f history” (McCIintock 1992).
These postmodernists, it is claimed, confuse the heterogeneity of colonial histories with
the postmodern pastiche. I contend that the mixture of positionalities itself is not a mark
of post-colonialism; it is not a postmodern pastiche nor the playful positioning of
heterogeneous positions. What is important is to realize that the subject is more than
position-holders, signifiers. Shohat rightly asks whether the post-colonial is an
epistemological notion or a chronological notion (Shohat 1992: 101). I think that the
post-colonial is firstly an epistemological notion. Epistemology produces knowledge;
epistemology is directly connected with power. A post-colonial epistemology will
produce post-colonial knowledge.
If so, how is the post-colonial epistemology characterized? Post-colonial
epistemology needs a subject who produces it and is simultaneously reproduced by it.
This subject has been repressed or forgotten but has functioned as a matrix which makes
signification possible. This subject is not merely a position-holder as the poststructuralists
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argue. The fundamental reason why the human subject holds the position imposed by the
cultural is that s/he believes that it confirms his/her fullness of being. Human beings strive
for being (absence o f absence) experienced in the real. In this sense, all human beings
want to have a relationship with the real, and this makes religion possible. But the
position imposed by the cultural cannot completely fill the gap or absence of being. The
void o f the human being, his/her recognition of it, his/her attempts to fill the void through
language, and the failure o f language (language does not represent something, but
represents the absence o f something) —all these, which cannot be filled by gaining the
position imposed by the cultural, are the true sources of agency. Language keeps
reminding the subject that something is missing. Therefore, the so-called play o f language
is a painful play. Language seems to function without any reference or matrix, but it in
fact has its reference. Zizek says, “all language is in a way an object-language: there is no
language without object. Even when the language is apparently caught in a web o f selfreferential movement, even when it is apparently speaking only about itself, there is an
objective, non-signifying ‘reference’ to this movement. The Lacanian mark of it is, of
course, the object petit a. The self-referential movement of the signifier is not that o f a
closed circle, but an elliptical movement around a certain void. And the object p etit a, as
the original lost object which in a way coincides with its own loss, is precisely the
embodiment o f this void” (Zizek 1989: 158). The Lacanian notion of symptom as a
“return of the repressed” is the clear evidence of it. Symptom is “the substance o f
enjoyment, the real kernel around which this signifying interplay is structured” (Zizek
1989: 72).
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The aims o f the politics of symptom change the subject o f the politics of identity
(i.e., Hegel’s subject o f desire, Freud’s ego or Lacan’s moi) and the subject of the politics
of representation (i.e., Freud’s masculine subject or Lacan’s speaking subject) into the
subject of the real. We cannot directly approach the real; only through symptoms can we
gain access to the real. According to Lacanian psychoanalysis, the foreclosed and the
repressed are returned in the form o f symptoms; “what was foreclosed for the Symbolic
returns in the Real o f the symptom” (Zizek 1989; 73); “Once thought is repressed, it does
not lie dormant. It connects up with other related thoughts and seeks expression
whenever possible in dreams, slips, bungled actions, and symptoms” (Fink 1997: 114).
We have to work with these symptoms.
The most outstanding symptoms among the psychotic (the subject o f the politics o f
identity) are hallucination, language disturbances, inability to create new metaphors,
predominance o f imaginary relations, invasion of jouissance, lack of control over drives,
and lack of question (Fink 1997: chapter 7). They can be roughly stated as follows: the
psychotic is not able to distinguish between fantasy and reality, but s/he is certain that
what s/he sees or hears is true or real; the psychotic suffers from language disturbance due
to the symbolic’s failure to overwrite the imaginary; words are things for the psychotic
due to the foreclosure o f the patemal metaphor which creates foundational, unshakable
meaning; the dyadic opposition of love/hate, life/death, etc. is predominant; in psychosis,
the drives are not hierachized in the body; the psychotic lacks movement or dialectic in
his/her thoughts and interest because s/he does not know desire which is in the Other.
Then, how do we work on these symptoms? We have to try to rewrite the psychotic’s
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imaginary with the symbolic: “he [Lacan] issues a warning: to reject the father’s role, to
undermine the father’s current symbolic function, will lead to no good; its consequences
are likely to be worse than those of the father function itself, increasing the incidence o f
the psychosis” (Fink 1997: 111). Lacanian psychoanalysis does not encourage the
romaticization of the psychotic as do some thinkers such as Deleuze and Guattari. What
is at issue is what kind o f symbolic we should embrace. Do we know symbolic order
other than the modem Westem symbolic? This requires us to inquire into other forms of
the symbolic.
It is clearer how to deal with the suubject of the politics o f representation. Fink
shows well how to deal with the neurotic.
The neurotic often comes to analysis stuck on the Other’s demands, asking
the analyst to teU him or her what to do —that is, to make demands; by
refusing to do so, the analyst seeks to open up a space of desire in which
the analysand’s desire comes to the fore in its subservience to the Other’s
desire; and by playing the role of object a, the analyst seeks to throw into
question the analysand’s interpretation of the Other’s desire in the
fimdamental fantasy and bring about its transformation, such that it no
longer inhibits the pursuit of satisfaction (Fink 1997: 210).
Like the psychotic, the neurotic can be also stuck in the imaginary. The neurotic
(mis)takes the Other’s demand as his/her desire. For example, the hysteric woman
mistakes her partner’s specific demand (for example, for passive sexuality) as her desire.
As demand, the hysteric is stuck in the imaginary register, and therefore, the hysteric tries
to be the specific demand. Such an effort to be the specific demand may repress her drives
and the repressed can return in such psychosomatic symptoms as back pains, shoulder
pains, jaw pains, tongue pains, stomach pains, etc. First, the politics of symptom aims to
symbolize the symptom (meaningless imaginary traces as weU as the substance of
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enjoyment). In other words, it aims to gives to the symptoms their symbolic place and
meaning. Second, the politics of symptom aims to make the neurotic subject the subject
as desire who is essentially a stance with respect to the symbolic Other. The subject as
desire recognizes that her desire is the Other’s desire. Finally, the neurotic is ready to be
the subject of the real. The neurotic realizes that s/he is not only a signifier of desire, but
is the subject o f the real who has his/her own object a. Zizek says, “we must read Freud’s
wo es war, soli ich werden. You, the subject, must identify yourself with the place where
your symptom already was. In its ‘pathological’ particularity you must recognize the
element which gives consistency to your being” (Zizek 1989: 75). The neurotic was a
subject of desire who desires the Other’s desire, but s/he now subjectivizes the desire and
enjoys his/her symptoms; the symptom is the substance of enjoyment, the real kernel
around which this signifying interplay (desire) is structured.
The politics of the symptom which I am here proposing recognizes the importance
of the author who represents/creates the subject and the other through his/her discourse.
The author is similar to the analyst in Lacanian psychoanalysis. S/he diagnoses the
subject’s symptoms and tries to make him/her the subject of the real. For the analyst, the
patient (the subject) is not a signifier that should be reintegrated into the symbolic. The
subject is more than a signifier that has its own symptoms. The author, thus, should not
ignore symptoms when s/he tries to understand/represent the subject.
For example, we may think of the restorationism and liquidationism prevalent in
the post-colonial countries. In Korea, for about a hundred years, westernized leaders tried
to erase the past and to follow the West. They blamed Korean tradition for mysticism. By
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contrast, some people movements (including Korean movements) tried to restore Korean
tradition. Westernized intellectuals blamed this movement for reactionism. They said that
history cannot be reversed. But we can think that restorationism is a symptom, the
substance o f enjoyment which gives consistency to Korean being. Korean tradition as a
symptom is the Real where was jouissance. It is the traumatic material of unassimilated
memories and meaning that blocks the dialectical movement of symbolization. Korean
people as post-colonial subjects should identify themselves with the place where their
symptoms already were and enjoy this symptom, the real kernel around which their desires
are structured. For this, they should realize that they are stuck in the imaginary, i.e., they
(mis)take the Westem Other’s demand as their desire. After that, they should try to
symbolize their symptoms. This is a precondition for their enjoyment of symptoms.
Go back to your symptoms. The real cause of your desire is not out there. It is
not in the Other, but in your symptoms. Everyting that has happend to you is your
responsibility. In this sense, the subject of the real is an ethical being who subjectivizes the
cause o f his/her desire.
A politics o f the symptom proposed by this thesis starts from the deconstruction of
the modem Westem notions of the subject. Lacanian psychoanalysis was used to analyze
how they are constituted and how they work. All political practices involve
representational levels. Modem Westem politics was based on the Westem subject and
the Rest others discursively represented by the Westem (masculine) authors. A politics of
the symptom works on what was foreclosed and repressed by modem Western discourse.
It aims to represent/produce an ethical subject who enjoys its symptom.
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